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THE TAX-IMMIGRATION NEXUS 
TESSA DAVIS† 
ABSTRACT 
Tax and immigration law have a shared interest in defining commu-
nity. In order to implement a tax, we must know who belongs to the tax-
able community. At the same time, immigration law must define and 
administer the requirements for membership in the national community. 
Despite the differing objectives of tax and immigration law—raising 
revenue and deciding who may enter, remain, and become a citizen in the 
United States, respectively—both of these regimes uses a concept of 
citizenship to define their respective communities. 
Starting from this common thread of the relevance of citizenship to 
both immigration and tax law, this Article draws upon social theory on 
citizenship to explore the many links between these seemingly disparate 
areas of law. Examination of these connections—what this Article calls 
the tax-immigration nexus—reveals that both areas of law draw upon the 
other to define citizenship. The interplay of tax and immigration citizen-
ship yields important insights for tax law and policy. 
One of these insights is that the use of tax compliance as a factor in 
immigration status, for example, revoking green card status for certain 
violations of the tax code, is inconsistent with widely-held objections to 
the taxation of U.S. citizens living abroad. Both green card holders and 
U.S. citizens living abroad represent examples of people who blur the 
line between citizen and noncitizen and their similarities and dissimilari-
ties compel re-evaluation of the current tax regime. This Article argues 
that there are good reasons to treat potential taxpayers who occupy this 
blurred space in a consistent manner. Along that line, this Article posits 
possible reforms to the taxation of lawful permanent residents that would 
help resolve the inequities within the tax-immigration nexus, as well as 
avenues for further research. 
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[I]f one sees law as exclusively concerned with the rules that regulate 
disputes, rather than as a realm in which a society and its members 
envision themselves and their connections to one another . . . then the 
reification of our momentary view of how the world is composed will 
triumph over our need to understand it from afar.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Citizenship confers rights and responsibilities.2 The scope of those 
rights and responsibilities is the focus of scholars across an array of dis-
ciplines. Citizen and citizenship—these terms are powerful markers of an 
individual’s status that influence the extent to which she belongs to a 
  
 1. LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION xii (2006). 
 2. So frequently stated as to rise to the level of truism, stated examples of this idea are nearly 
ubiquitous in the relevant literature. For one of many, see Thomas Faist, Shapeshifting Citizenship in 
Germany: Expansion, Erosion and Extension, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP: A SLIPPERY 
CONCEPT 193, 195 (Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann & Margaret Walton-Roberts eds., 2015) 
(“[C]itizenship comprises equal rights and obligations for all full members. . . . Obligations com-
prise, for instance, tax liability . . . .”). 
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community and the rights and responsibilities that she may exercise and 
must uphold. The inclination may be to assume that citizenship is within 
the purview of immigration and naturalization law3 with no relationship 
to taxation. Citizenship is, however, a key point of connection between 
these two areas of law. 
Immigration law, by defining and policing the requirements of citi-
zenship, governs how an individual gains entry into and formal member-
ship in the national community.4 Tax law is similarly interested in com-
munity, namely the taxable community, and frequently uses citizenship 
to define that community.5 At times the immigration and tax concepts of 
citizenship overlap, and at other points they diverge. This Article ex-
plores the ties between immigration and tax and their two distinct but 
overlapping concepts of citizenship, labeling the space created by such 
overlap the tax-immigration nexus. 
To begin to understand the tax-immigration nexus, consider the ex-
ample found in the recent Supreme Court case of Kawashima v. Holder.6 
The case involved two lawful permanent residents who pled guilty to a 
criminal tax offense.7 Lawful permanent resident (LPR) is the immigra-
tion law label for individuals colloquially known as “green card holders.” 
LPRs are then, in short, authorized immigrants who have lived in the 
United States for an extended period and may remain if they continue to 
comply with certain laws. Though LPRs may apply to become natural-
ized citizens after meeting statutorily prescribed requirements, they are 
not citizens under immigration law. Tax law takes a different view, how-
ever. 
Under current law, the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) defines 
LPRs as “resident aliens,”8 drawing them into a category this Article 
terms “tax citizens.” As tax citizens, LPRs are part of the taxable com-
munity and subject to the same laws and rates as individuals who are 
born or naturalized citizens (hereinafter referred to as “formal citizens”). 
A tax citizen should be distinguished from another class of individuals 
the Code terms “nonresident aliens.” Nonresident aliens are taxable only 
on their income that can be “sourced” as U.S. income.9 An individual 
  
 3. Throughout the rest of this Article, I use “immigration law” to encompass both immigra-
tion and naturalization law. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that all individuals born or naturalized in the 
United States are citizens of the United States). See generally Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012) (continuing where the 14th Amendment left off and fleshing out the 
naturalization process). 
 5. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 6. 565 U.S. 478 (2012). 
 7. For a full discussion of Kawashima v. Holder, see infra Part I. 
 8. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 9. Source rules help in the often challenging task of determining the location of and appro-
priate taxing jurisdiction for a given bit of income. See, e.g., REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH ET AL., U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 31 (3d ed. 2011) (“The source rules are provisions of the Code (and tax 
treaties) that designate rules for assigning income to a particular jurisdiction.”). 
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may, then, be a tax citizen without being a formal citizen.10 This disjunct 
between the immigration concept of citizenship and tax citizenship was 
the root of the challenges the LPRs faced in Kawashima and is the point 
of focus of this Article. 
Kawshima is essentially a relatively technical statutory interpreta-
tion case. In the case, the Supreme Court had to interpret a specific para-
graph of the Immigration and Nationality Act that defines so-called “ag-
gravated felonies.” An LPR found guilty of an aggravated felony may be 
removed at any point after being admitted to the United States.11 In con-
trast, an LPR found guilty only of a crime of moral turpitude—a category 
of crimes that is distinct from but overlaps with aggravated felonies—
may be removed, on the basis of that crime, in a more limited time frame 
after admission or after commission of multiple offenses.12 The Court 
held that the tax offense to which the Kawashimas pled guilty qualified 
as an aggravated felony, thereby rendering the Kawashimas deportable 
even after they served their time for the offense. 
Kawashima marked an expansion of the range of tax crimes that 
count as aggravated felonies for the Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
INA), but it did not create the tax-immigration nexus. Immigration law 
has, for decades, used tax offenses as proxies for identifying individuals 
who are or will be “good citizens”—who behave as we believe citizens 
behave (or should). By being in the vulnerable position of tax citizens 
who share the same tax responsibilities as formal citizens but who lack 
formal citizenship, the Kawashimas, and all other LPRs, reside in an 
insecure space. The government demands the same compliance of LPRs 
as it does formal citizens but it punishes LPRs’ noncompliance much 
more severely. 
The core questions raised by Kawashima, specifically, and the tax-
immigration nexus, generally are: What is the proper relationship be-
tween tax law and immigration? When does being a good tax citizen 
come to bear on formal citizenship? Does it follow that a “bad” tax citi-
zen makes a bad formal citizen? Who is worthy of citizenship? Of per-
manent, full membership in the American community? Kawashima, and 
  
 10. The reverse does not follow. Though a formal citizen may not have positive tax liability, 
she remains a “tax citizen” as defined by this paper—an individual subject to tax on her worldwide 
income. Under current law, the U.S. government asserts the right to tax a U.S. citizen on her world-
wide income unless she renounces or loses that citizenship, a fact that may trigger a set of exit rules. 
See generally I.R.C. §§ 877, 877A (2012), for the language of the expatriation taxes. Additionally, 
see infra Section III.B for a discussion of the current tax regime as applied to tax citizens. 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (defining one class of removable aliens as “[a]n alien 
who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable”). 
 12. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (defining one class of removable aliens as “[a]ny alien who––(I) is 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the case 
of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 1255(j) of this title) after the date 
of admission, and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be 
imposed, is deportable”). 
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the recognition of the tax-immigration nexus that it strengthens, illus-
trates that both tax and immigration law have something to say on these 
issues. 
Much of the recent scholarship on taxation and citizenship in the 
United States explores the long-arm of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.13 
Unlike most nations, the United States employs citizenship-based taxa-
tion on worldwide income. If you are a citizen, your income, wherever 
earned, is taxable.14 Through the resident alien category, the Code ren-
ders certain noncitizens as tax citizens, making them taxable on the same 
terms as born or naturalized citizens. Lastly, nonresident, noncitizens are 
taxed on their United States source income, a tax concept defined by 
multiple authorities. The result is an aggressive system of taxation that 
constructs both citizens and noncitizen residents as tax citizens. More 
pointedly, whether the individual has the full benefits, however con-
ceived, of U.S. citizenship, she may bear one of its burdens: to pay in-
come tax. 
Five distinguishable communities exist within the current regime 
and scholarship on citizenship-based taxation: resident citizens, nonresi-
dent citizens, LPRs, noncitizens who qualify as tax residents who are not 
LPRs,15 and noncitizen, nonresidents. Though some scholars defend citi-
zenship-based taxation, an increasing number criticize the system as un-
  
 13. For comprehensive discussion of citizenship and taxation, see generally Allison Chris-
tians, Drawing the Boundaries of Tax Justice, in QUEST FOR TAX REFORM CONTINUES: THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION ON TAXATION 50 YEARS LATER 53, 53 (Kim Brooks ed., 2013); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
The Case Against Taxing Citizens, TAX NOTES INT’L, May 2010, at 680; Cynthia Blum & Paula N. 
Singer, A Coherent Policy Proposal for U.S. Residence-Based Taxation of Individuals, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 705 (2008); Mark S. Hoose, Trading One Danger for Another: Creating U.S. Tax 
Residency While Fleeing Violence at Home, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 827 (2012); Michael S. Kirsch, 
Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad: Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX 
REV. 117 (2014) [hereinafter Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad]; Michael S. 
Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (2007) [hereinafter Kirsch, 
Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy]; Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immi-
grants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2006); Ruth 
Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169 (2016); Philip F. Postlewaite & Gregory E. 
Stern, Innocents Abroad? The 1978 Foreign Earned Income Act and the Case for Its Repeal, 65 VA. 
L. REV. 1093 (1979); Renée Judith Sobel, United States Taxation of Its Citizens Abroad: Incentive 
or Equity, 38 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1985); Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: 
Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1289 (2011); Almaz Zelleke, 
Basic Income in the United States: Redefining Citizenship in the Liberal State, 63 REV. SOC. ECON. 
633 (2005); Notably, scholars have also explored the impact of citizenship status on the provision of 
benefits through the tax code, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
 14. I use taxable rather than taxed deliberately. Importantly, due to international law norms, 
treaties, and substantive tax law in the form of credits and an exemption, the determination that 
income is taxable does not mean it will be taxed. See generally I.R.C. §§ 901, 911 (2012). The tax 
treatment of citizens and noncitizens, whether resident or nonresident, will be discussed infra Sec-
tion III.B. 
 15. Both LPRs and resident noncitizens who are not LPRs fall under the category of “resident 
alien” defined in I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (2012), unless an exception applies. A nonresident nonciti-
zen is, in the language of tax, a nonresident alien per § 7701(b)(1)(B). 
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fair and inefficient,16 citing particular concern for nonresident citizens.17 
This Article focuses instead on the tax treatment of noncitizens, specifi-
cally LPRs—a group that has received little scholarly attention—as an-
other instructive group in evaluating the tax-immigration nexus and its 
implications for tax law and policy. 
To fully conceptualize the tax-immigration nexus requires expand-
ing our concept of citizenship with the help of social theory. Immigration 
law uses culturally contingent concepts of what constitutes a citizen. Tax 
law uses both formal, objective notions of citizenship and, I will argue, 
informal, culturally contingent constructions of citizenship.18 Formal 
citizenship is sufficient to exercise the power to tax but is not necessary. 
As in the case of the Kawashimas, an individual may become a taxpayer 
because of her formal status governed by immigration law or because of 
a determination that she behaves as a citizen per the Code. 
Identifying the depth and breadth of the tax-immigration nexus re-
veals that tax law is more bludgeon than not. Citizenship-based taxation 
and the characterization of tax noncompliance as deportable offenses or 
offenses showing poor moral character both rely heavily upon a clear 
benefit/tax nexus. As a citizen or potential citizen, you receive benefits 
from the government for which you must pay. Under this approach, the 
role of tax law in constructing citizenship is essentially a one-way street. 
Failure to pay taxes may result in denial of citizenship status but compli-
ance is simply a bare minimum requirement on a path toward citizenship. 
In its definition of resident alien, the Code severs any necessary ties be-
tween the concept of tax citizenship and formal citizenship. A practical 
result of this tax citizen status is the heaping of one of the most salient 
burdens of citizenship on noncitizens without conveying the full benefits 
of citizenship. Stated differently, paying income tax does not make an 
individual a citizen, but you will be hard-pressed to avoid paying for 
benefits you are considered to have received. 
The tax-immigration nexus places tax in the familiar but challeng-
ing position of being both revenue raiser and tool of social policy. While 
the dual role is acceptable or even appropriate in other areas, such as 
  
 16. Compare Mason, supra note 13 (criticizing the system as unfair and inefficient), with 
Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad, supra note 13 (offering an argument in 
favor of citizenship taxation). 
 17. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) has only strengthened the sense of 
urgency of this discussion. See, e.g., Am. Citizens Abroad, Residence-Based Taxation: A Necessary 
and Urgent Tax Reform 3 (Apr. 2015) (unpublished proposal submitted to the Senate Fin. Comm. 
Individual Income Tax & Int’l Working Grps.), 
https://www.americansabroad.org/media/files/files/9960ba5d/ACA_RBT_proposal_for_submission_
to_Senate_Finance_April_2015.pdf. A potential reform spurred by FATCA and FBAR is discussed 
infra Section IV.B.2. 
 18. This Article describes this informal construction of citizenship as “performative citizen-
ship.” As will be discussed infra Part II, performative citizenship may be formalized into legal 
requirements. 
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wealth redistribution, tax law should proceed cautiously when the policy 
at issue is a concept as foundational as who can be a citizen. To the ex-
tent we are concerned with the depth of the tax-immigration nexus, some 
solutions may lie outside tax law. For example, immigration law and 
policy theorists could reconsider whether tax crimes should constitute 
removable offenses. Scholars focused on the emergence of “Crimmigra-
tion law” may further investigate the relevance of the tax-immigration 
nexus to that discussion.19 But examining the tax-immigration nexus 
through the case study of LPRs yields important lessons for mainstream 
tax as well. A comprehensive understanding of the tax-immigration nex-
us could contribute to the emerging work on human rights and taxation.20 
Specifically, this Article argues that the tax treatment of LPRs yields 
multiple insights for tax law and policy: doing so undermines benefit 
theory arguments against citizenship-based taxation, creates opportuni-
ties for strengthening compliance across populations, may support fiscal 
citizenship, and suggests that fairness in tax policy compels different 
treatment of tax citizens than exists under the current regime. 
The stakes are high. The Department of Homeland Security Office 
of Immigration Statistics most recent estimates provide that there are 
13.1 million LPRs living in the United States.21 A population that is 
regularly in flux as eligible LPRs naturalize and new individuals gain 
LPR status, the overall number of LPRs is slow to change. Approximate-
ly two thirds of the 2013 LPR population was eligible to naturalize with 
the remaining third not yet eligible.22 Of the portion of LPRs eligible to 
naturalize, a majority will do so, but a significant number desire to com-
plete the naturalization process but struggle with language or cost barri-
ers.23 It is this population—LPRs who have yet to naturalize—who most 
forcefully blur the line between citizen and noncitizen, while also facing 
insecurity not shared by the formal citizens with whom they share the 
same potential tax burden. 
  
 19. A brief introduction to crimmigration law is provided infra Part I. 
 20. In September 2016, New York University School of Law hosted a conference entitled 
“Human Rights and Tax in an Unequal World.” More information on the conference and paper 
abstracts may be found at http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Human-Rights-Tax-in-an-
Unequal-World_Conference-Program-1.pdf. 
 21. BRYAN BAKER & NANCY RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: JANUARY 2013, at 3 (2014), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2013_0.pdf. 
 22. Id. To be eligible for naturalization, an individual must satisfy a number of requirements 
including: be legally present in country for the statutorily required period, be of good moral charac-
ter, and pass naturalization tests. For a comprehensive, non-technical discussion of the requirements 
see generally U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., A GUIDE 
TO NATURALIZATION 17 (2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/M-476.pdf. 
 23. ANA GONZALEZ-BARRERA ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PATH NOT TAKEN: TWO-
THIRDS OF LEGAL MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS 7 (2013), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2013/02/Naturalizations_Jan_2013_FINAL.pdf. 
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Part I details the scope of the Article and discusses the recent ex-
pansion of the tax-immigration nexus brought by the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Kawashima. Part II lays the groundwork for conceptualizing 
the tax-immigration nexus by examining citizenship in social theory. Part 
III defines the boundaries of the tax-immigration nexus, applying social 
theory to identify tax law’s direct and indirect roles in defining citizen-
ship, as well as immigration law’s contributions to the nexus. Part IV 
argues that recognizing the existence and the depth of the tax-
immigration nexus requires reconsidering taxation of LPRs. Part IV then 
addresses the relevance of the tax-immigration nexus to the citizenship-
based taxation debate, highlighting the ways in which both LPRs and 
nonresident U.S. citizens blur the boundaries of citizenship. The Part 
then concludes by evaluating potential reforms that respect the im-
portance of the tax-immigration nexus while remedying its inequities, as 
well as identifying areas for further study. 
I. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: TAXATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
The relationship between taxation and citizenship is no stranger to 
scholarly inquiry. This Article departs from the trend, however, of debat-
ing the fairness of citizenship-based taxation—the system used by the 
United States that asserts the right to tax citizens on their worldwide in-
come—as applied to nonresident U.S. citizens.24 Instead, using the Su-
preme Court’s 2012 decision in Kawashima as a frame, this Article turns 
its focus back stateside to another population: LPRs. LPRs are, as will be 
examined in further detail, classified as resident aliens, making them 
what this Article terms tax citizens. As a group, the tax treatment of 
LPRs has yet to be thoroughly addressed. The Article fills that gap in the 
literature. 
Reconsidering the fundamental fairness of the current tax regime’s 
treatment of LPRs is particularly timely. Immigration reform is on the 
forefront of national political discussions, and the actions of the next 
Presidential administration may significantly impact the lives of the ap-
proximately 40–45 million immigrants living in the United States.25 The 
  
 24. For further discussion, see infra Part IV. For scholarship on this topic, see sources cited 
supra note 13. 
 25. The rhetoric of this election season alone places immigration at the forefront of debate, a 
fact that many LPRs have noted. Ed O’Keefe, Citizenship Applications Soar in Trump’s Wake, 
WASH. POST (May 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2016/05/27/citizenship-applications-soar-in-trumps-wake/. In celebration of Hispanic 
Heritage Month, President Obama gave a speech to the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, alluding to 
the possibility of a regressive subsequent administration. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Address at 
39th Annual Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute Public Policy Conference and Annual Awards 
Gala (Sept. 15, 2016) (“[B]ut if we’re truly going to fix this system, we’re going to have to push 
back against bluster, falsehoods, and promises of higher walls.”). The relevant part of President 
Obama’s speech begins at 7:51. See Felicia Escobar, Celebrating Hispanic Heritage Month: “Immi-
grants Are the American Character,” WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 16, 2016, 4:47 PM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/09/16/immigrants-are-american-character. Estimates of the 
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taxation of unauthorized immigrants presents a distinct though overlap-
ping set of concerns, as does the taxation of individuals present in the 
United States on nonimmigrant visas. Indeed, both groups could be the 
subjects of separate articles.26 What makes LPRs a good population of 
focus is that they share both formal and substantive similarities with born 
or naturalized U.S. citizens.27 Because LPRs possess green cards, a pre-
requisite to naturalization for most immigrants, they are already further 
along the path to citizenship than many other immigrants. Further, as this 
Article argues, LPRs are performing citizenship though they lack the 
protections of formal status as citizens.28 
Though current law taxes LPRs the same as U.S. citizens, the con-
sequences of noncompliance with the tax laws results in markedly dis-
parate outcomes depending upon on which side of the citizen line an 
individual stands.29 Herein lies a core concern of this Article: though 
Congress may have valid reasons for wanting to tax LPRs and U.S. citi-
zens the same—reasons that will be explored later—the two groups are, 
in fact, distinct in meaningful ways that undermine the validity of that 
desire. Stated simply, an LPR’s noncompliance with tax law may close 
the door to naturalization or result in removal of that individual from the 
United States, whereas the same noncompliance by a citizen results in, at 
best, monetary penalties and, at worst, jail time. The fact that it is immi-
gration law that leads to these outsized punishments30 for the same 
crimes does not negate the relevance of those potential outcomes to tax 
  
immigrant population are available from multiple entities. The estimates used here come from the 
following sources: PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN IMMIGRATION WAVE BRINGS 59 MILLION TO 
U.S., DRIVING POPULATION GROWTH AND CHANGE THROUGH 2065, at 7 (2015), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/09/28/modern-immigration-wave-brings-59-million-to-u-s-
driving-population-growth-and-change-through-2065/; Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Frequently 
Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 
(Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-
and-immigration-united-states. As this Article goes to print, the impact of now President Trump’s 
actions on the desire to immigrate or naturalize cannot be determined, though his orders and rhetoric 
suggest immigrants face even greater uncertainty. 
 26. For an excellent tax policy discussion of the taxation of unauthorized immigrants, see 
Lipman, supra note 13. The topic has also been in the popular media. See, e.g., Alexia Fernández 
Campbell, The Truth About Undocumented Immigrants and Taxes, ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/09/undocumented-immigrants-and-taxes/499604/ 
(discussing how the Social Security system has come to rely upon the funds contributed by undocu-
mented immigrants which they will not claim). 
 27. Much of the analysis of the fairness (or lack thereof) of the tax treatment of lawful perma-
nent residents may hold for the other class of what I describe as “tax citizens”—individuals taxed as 
citizens by operation of § 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code but who do not have a green card (e.g., 
unauthorized immigrants or individuals present in the United States with authorization but who are 
not exempt from resident alien status). See I.R.S. § 7701 (2012). 
 28. Of course, other immigrants may be performing citizenship in ways substantially similar 
to U.S. citizens and LPRs. The rationale for focusing on LPRs at this juncture is that they combine 
formal and performative citizenship in ways that are particularly relevant for a comparison with 
nonresident U.S. citizens. Future work may focus, however, on the taxation of other resident nonciti-
zens.  
 29. See infra note 34 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III. 
 30. For a full discussion of the collateral immigration consequences of tax offenses, see infra 
Section III.A. 
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policy. Though tax noncompliance has had immigration consequences 
for decades, the Supreme Court case of Kawashima has made evident the 
fundamental insecurity of LPRs and has set the stage for re-evaluating 
whether the current law fairly taxes LPRs in light of the significance of 
the tax-immigration nexus. 
Kawashima is not a tax case in the sense that it does not concern 
matters of tax doctrine. Its relevance for tax law and policy is, neverthe-
less, significant. To immigration scholars, it is a story of administrative 
law and proper deference in the immigration context or the failure of the 
Court to respect the rule of lenity in immigration cases.31 To criminal law 
scholars, it raises questions of prosecutorial discretion or what constitutes 
competent counsel when advising a client of the consequences of accept-
ing a plea bargain.32 To others, it may be one more case evincing the 
march of crimmigration law—a term coined to describe the convergence 
of immigration and criminal law33—by further expanding the number of 
offenses with grave immigration consequences.34 To tax scholars, it 
should be understood as an opportunity—an opportunity to acknowledge 
  
 31. For scholarship discussing Kawashima and immigration law, see Kevin R. Johnson & 
Serena Faye Salinas, Judicial Remands of Immigration Cases: Lessons in Administrative Discretion 
from INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041 (2012); Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the 
Courts?: The Supreme Court’s Recent Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens, 26 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313 (2012); Matthew F. Soares, Note, Agencies and Aliens: A Modified Approach 
to Chevron Deference in Immigration Cases, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 925, 926, 941–42 (2014). The 
rule of lenity counsels that when an ambiguity exists in an immigration law it should be construed in 
the immigrant’s favor. For an early case invoking the rule of lenity in immigration law, see Bonetti 
v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691, 699 (1958) (drawing upon the rule of lenity developed in criminal law 
statutory interpretation in stating “[w]hen Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to 
Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this not out of 
any sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in proscribing 
evil or anti-social conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve 
doubts . . . against the imposition of a harsher punishment.” (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 
81, 83 (1955))). 
 32. For recent criminal law scholarship discussing Kawashima and these concepts, see gener-
ally Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice for Noncitizen 
Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1 (2012); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminaliza-
tion, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715 (2013); Hon. John H. Wilson, Are There Still Collateral 
Consequences in New York After Padilla?, 29 TOURO L. REV. 545 (2013). 
 33. For an introduction to the concept of crimmigration law, see generally the oft-cited Teresa 
A. Miller, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sover-
eign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
 34. Miller, supra note 33, at 620–35 (discussing the expansion of offenses giving rise to 
removal); id. at 622 (“Although immigration law could, and often did, impose hardships on excluda-
ble and deportable aliens, the regime of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s was arguably less punitive 
than it is today. The U.S. economy was robust, rates of migration to the United States were far lower 
and public attitudes toward immigrants were far more welcoming. Immigration law of this period 
has been characterized as liberal in its willingness to prioritize the natural rights of immigrants; 
humanitarian; family-oriented; service-oriented; even procedurally exuberant. Indeed, the contrasts 
are stark, yet to characterize this era as a due process ‘revolution’ overstates the fact. Immigrants, 
particularly refugees and asylum seekers, enjoyed perhaps the fullest privileges than ever before (or 
after). Even illegal immigrants were broadly tolerated on a level that was unprecedented in the 
modem era. The grounds for deportation of criminal and illegal aliens were narrower, the use of 
detention was less frequent, avenues for relief from detention were much broader, judicial review of 
deportation orders was broader, and far fewer immigration violations were criminally punishable.”). 
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the connections of tax with other areas of law and to use the lessons 
learned from examining those connections to strengthen tax law and pol-
icy. 
Kawashima is, on its face, a statutory interpretation case where the 
statute under consideration comes from immigration law.35 The petition-
ers in the case, Akio and Fusako Kawashima, were LPRs in the United 
States but citizens of Japan.36 Thirteen years after becoming LPRs, the 
Kawashimas pleaded guilty to making and subscribing a false tax return 
and aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return, tax 
crimes per § 7206(1) & (2).37 It was not the substance of their tax crimes 
but the collateral immigration consequences of those crimes that took the 
Kawashimas’ case to the Supreme Court. After serving their time for 
their violations of § 7206, the Kawashimas found themselves facing re-
moval as aliens convicted of an aggravated felony under § 1227 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.38 The connection to tax, and the statute 
the Court interpreted, was the definition of aggravated felony under 
  
 35. See Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 486–89 (2012) (resolving a circuit split on the 
issue of whether tax crimes other than § 7201 were aggravated felonies under the INA). In holding 
that clause (i) incorporates other tax crimes, the Court overruled the Third Circuit’s holding in Ki Se 
Lee v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004), in which that court found the statute ambiguous and 
found the rule of lenity to apply. Id. at 488–89. 
 36. Id. at 480. 
 37. Id.; I.R.C. § 7206 (2012) (providing the provision is punishable by monetary penalties 
and/or imprisonment of up to three years). The statute reads as follows: 
Any person who––(1) Declaration under penalties of perjury.—Willfully makes and sub-
scribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a writ-
ten declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not be-
lieve to be true and correct as to every material matter; or (2) Aid or assistance.—
Willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the preparation or presenta-
tion under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the internal revenue laws, of a 
return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent or is false as to any mate-
rial matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the 
person authorized or required to present such return, affidavit, claim, or document; or 
(3) Fraudulent bonds, permits, and entries.—Simulates or falsely or fraudulently executes 
or signs any bond, permit, entry, or other document required by the provisions of the in-
ternal revenue laws, or by any regulation made in pursuance thereof, or procures the same 
to be falsely or fraudulently executed, or advises, aids in, or connives at such execution 
thereof; or (4) Removal or concealment with intent to defraud.—Removes, deposits, or 
conceals, or is concerned in removing, depositing, or concealing, any goods or commodi-
ties for or in respect whereof any tax is or shall be imposed, or any property upon which 
levy is authorized by section 6331, with intent to evade or defeat the assessment or col-
lection of any tax imposed by this title; or (5) Compromises and closing agreements—In 
connection with any compromise under section 7122, or offer of such compromise, or in 
connection with any closing agreement under section 7121, or offer to enter into any such 
agreement, willfully.—(A) Concealment of property.—Conceals from any officer or em-
ployee of the United States any property belonging to the estate of a taxpayer or other 
person liable in respect of the tax, or (B) Withholding, falsifying, and destroying rec-
ords.—Receives, withholds, destroys, mutilates, or falsifies any book, document, or rec-
ord, or makes any false statement, relating to the estate or financial condition of the tax-
payer or other person liable in respect of the tax; shall be guilty of a felony and, upon 
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a cor-
poration), or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of prose-
cution. 
I.R.C. § 7206. 
 38. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 481. 
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§ 1101(a)(43)(M) of the INA.39 Though the concept of an aggravated 
felony came into law in 1988,40 it was not until 1994 that tax crimes spe-
cifically entered the fray, as § 7201 tax evasion became a specifically 
enumerated aggravated felony.41 After the majority handed down its 
opinion, not only § 7201 tax evasion, but any tax crime involving fraud 
or deceit and a loss to the government of more than $10,000 would quali-
fy as an aggravated felony.42 The tax-immigration nexus—the connec-
tions between tax and immigration law identified in the Article—existed 
before Kawashima. However, Kawashima left that nexus stronger than 
before the Court considered it and § 1101(a)(43)(M). 
The outcome of Kawashima raises the question of the proper rela-
tionship between tax law and immigration. One could assume that the 
answer to that question is one of immigration law and policy. Indeed, 
that is the approach Justice Ginsburg takes in her dissent. Recognizing 
the essential question underlying the outcome of Kawashima, Justice 
Ginsburg poses the question: “One might also ask what reason Congress 
would have for making a tax misdemeanor a deportable offense, while 
more serious crimes do not jeopardize an alien’s residency in the United 
States.”43 As an example, Justice Ginsburg notes that “driving while 
drunk causing serious bodily injury” was found not to be an aggravated 
felony 44 Justice Ginsburg doubts the wisdom of the majority opinion not 
  
 39. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (2012) (identifying the following as an aggravated felony: 
“an offense that—(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds 
$10,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of Title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue 
loss to the Government exceeds $10,000”). 
 40. Miller, supra note 33, at 633 (providing at its outset, the category was much more limited, 
including only “murder, drug trafficking and firearms trafficking crimes”). Miller notes, however, 
that “[t]he scope of crimes defined as aggravated felonies has continued to grow in waves of subse-
quent legislation.” Id. Kawashima may then be understood as part of the expansion described in 
Miller’s article. 565 U.S. at 487–89 (suggesting that tax crimes fall under the definition of aggravat-
ed felony). 
 41. Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 
§ 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4322 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (2012)) (“(M) an 
offense that—(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds 
$200,000; or (ii) is described in section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to tax 
evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $200,000.”); OFFICE OF 
IMMIGRATION LITIG., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS: PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 23 (2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/05/03/REVISED%20Padilla%20v.%20
Kentucky%20Reference%20Guide_11-8-10.pdf. 
 42. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M). See generally Kawashima, 565 U.S. 478. 
 43. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 497 n.2. An example of one such tax misdemeanor taken from 
my own home state of South Carolina provides, in pertinent part:  
(3) A person required under any provision of law administered by the department and 
who wilfully fails to pay any estimated tax or tax, or who is required by any provision of 
law or by any regulation and who wilfully fails to make a return, keep records, or supply 
information, at the time or times required by law or regulation, in addition to other penal-
ties provided by law, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not 
more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, together 
with the cost of prosecution. 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-54-44(A)(3) (2016). A court could plausibly, post-Kawashima, find the requi-
site fraud and deceit present in commission of the misdemeanor to satisfy § 1101(a)(43)(M). 
 44. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 497 n.2. 
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only because of its take on statutory interpretation but also because of its 
strengthening of the tax-immigration nexus by expanding the range of 
tax crimes that constitute aggravated felonies. As the Kawashima deci-
sion strengthens the tax-immigration nexus, it gives rise to significant 
proportionality concerns.45 With a strengthened nexus comes even great-
er proportionality concerns because, as the scope of tax crimes that lead 
to removal broadens, the chance an LPR will face harsher consequences 
than a formal citizen for the same conduct increases. 
Justice Thomas addresses the tax-immigration nexus indirectly. 
Writing for the majority, he implies the distinction between drunk driv-
ing and the range of tax crimes that may lead to removal: the presence or 
absence of fraud and deceit.46 Certainly one can cause a crash that results 
in serious injury or death without engaging in any willfully fraudulent or 
deceitful conduct. To commit tax evasion without engaging in fraud or 
deceit would, however, be an impressive feat.47 Stated differently, to the 
majority, the relevance of tax crimes is not that they violate tax law but 
simply that a tax crime is a violation of law, an act that casts the individ-
ual as unworthy of citizenship, a “bad citizen.” 
The concerns of proportionality and morality that give rise to the 
majority and dissenting opinions ultimately center upon a core concern: 
Who is worthy of citizenship? Of permanent, full membership in the 
American community? These questions alone support exploring the tax-
  
 45. Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 415, 416 (2012) (providing that proportionality is the idea that “the severity of a 
sanction should not be excessive in relation to the gravity of an offense”). There is a healthy immi-
gration law literature on proportionality and its relevance to immigration law and policy. As a point 
of entry into this discussion, see generally Wishnie, supra, and Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1732–40 (2009). 
 46. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 482–87 (writing for the majority in a 6–3 opinion, Justice Thom-
as addresses the fraud and/or deceit inherent in certain tax crimes as he rejects the petitioners’ argu-
ments that Congress, writing in the disjunctive, intended to exclude tax crimes from clause (i) of 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)). 
 47. Id. at 484–85 (holding that clause (ii) intended to clarify that § 7201 tax evasion was an 
aggravated felony in the event that crime was committed without involving fraud or deceit). Earlier 
in his opinion, Justice Thomas states that the absence of fraud or deceit as elements of § 7206 does 
not defeat the respondent’s position that § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) applies to the petitioners because, he 
states without extensive reasoning: “The elements of willfully making and subscribing a false corpo-
rate tax return . . . establish that those crimes are deportable offenses because they necessarily entail 
deceit.” Id. at 484–85. It is hard to imagine satisfying the elements of § 7206 without engaging in 
fraudulent or deceitful conduct but then, so to, is it hard to imagine satisfying the elements of § 7201 
without engaging in the same. See id. at 493–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg ques-
tions the majority’s reasoning on this point, stating:  
The Court acknowledges that evasion-of-payment cases almost always “involve some af-
firmative acts of fraud or deceit.” Still, there may be a rare case in which that is not so. 
Rare, indeed: imaginary would be an apt characterization. The Government conceded 
that, to its knowledge, there have been no actual instances of indictments for tax evasion 
unaccompanied by any act of fraud or deceit. 
Id. at 495 (citations omitted). That Justice Thomas easily finds fraud or deceit to be satisfied by the 
elements of § 7206 but raises the specter of their absence in § 7201 as the motivating factor for 
Congress to create a largely redundant clause (ii) undercuts the logic of his opinion. “In other words, 
in holding that Clause (i) includes tax offenses, the Court finds Clause (ii) largely, but not totally, 
redundant.” Id. at 494. 
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immigration law nexus. After all, “[t]axes formalize our obligations to 
each other. . . . [S]ignify[ing] who is a member of our political communi-
ty, [and] how wide we draw the circle of ‘we.’”48 Investigating the tax-
immigration nexus and immigration law’s reliance upon tax offenses in 
defining a citizen could be the substance of an entire article (if not a 
book). But Kawashima, and the substantive immigration law provisions 
it interprets, is not the only point of connection between tax and immi-
gration. Tax law itself draws upon the concept of citizenship and immi-
gration law as it works to define the taxable community. This Article 
argues, however, the existing literature on citizenship in tax suffers two 
shortfalls: first, it relies too heavily upon a formal, legalistic definition of 
citizenship, and second, it fails to appreciate the full extent of points of 
overlap between tax and immigration law that constitute the tax-
immigration nexus. This Article seeks to address these shortfalls and 
contribute to the tax literature by exploring the implications of the tax-
immigration nexus for substantive tax law and policy, the fiscal sociolo-
gy49 literature by describing tax law’s active role in constructing citizen-
ship,50 as well as the immigration and crimmigration policy literature. 
Doing so requires (1) expanding our notion of citizenship in tax beyond 
the formal status determined by immigration law, an expansion that so-
cial theory on citizenship allows, and (2) acknowledging51 and defining 
the tax-immigration nexus. The next two Parts address each of these 
points in turn. 
II. BEYOND LEGAL STATUS: THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 
Line drawing is a critically important aspect of tax law. Sorting or-
dinary assets from capital assets impacts, among other things, the rate 
applied to gain from that asset.52 Debt receives markedly different treat-
  
 48. Isaac William Martin et al., The Thunder of History: The Origins and Development of the 
New Fiscal Sociology, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE AND 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Isaac William Martin et al. eds., 2009). 
 49. Id. at 2 (describing how fiscal sociology embraces the idea that tax should be studied in an 
interdisciplinary fashion: “We chose the name fiscal sociology . . . to suggest a science that would 
transcend increasingly narrow disciplines and unite the study of economics with the study of history, 
politics, and society”). 
 50. Id. at 2–4. Exploring the active role tax law plays in constructing citizenship situates this 
Article squarely within the goals of what the editors term the “new fiscal sociology.” Id. at 3 (“What 
is new about the new fiscal sociology is its recognition that taxation has a theoretical or causal—and 
not just a symptomatic or methodological—importance.”). 
 51. Stumpf, supra note 33, at 377 (describing how crimmigration law scholars note that 
immigration and criminal scholars have similarly failed to acknowledge the overlap of their respec-
tive areas of law). Stumpf writes:  
Yet little has been written about why this merger has occurred, and what are its theoreti-
cal underpinnings. Scholars of criminal and immigration law have tended to stay on their 
own sides of the fence, focusing on developments within their fields rather than examin-
ing the growing intersections between these two areas.  
Id. 
 52. See Nohel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Prefer-
ence, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 322–24 (1993) (providing an excellent discussion of the definition and 
tax treatment of capital gains). The concept of capital gains holds that certain types of income (such 
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ment than equity—a fact that creates frustration for tax students and op-
portunity for practitioners.53 A complex system of rules and standards 
pervades tax law to assist in the line-drawing project.54 Drawing the line 
between those inside and outside the taxable community is part of that 
project, and tax law uses citizenship to tackle it. Superficially, tax relies 
upon a simple rule to identify citizens: any person defined as a U.S. citi-
zen under the Constitution or by immigration law is a U.S. citizen for tax 
purposes. But to say tax uses only a formal concept of citizenship would 
be error. Examining tax law and scholarship through the lens of social 
theory, specifically anthropological and sociological theory, reveals that 
tax relies upon both the legalistic, formal concept of citizenship as legal 
status and its own more standard-like concept of citizenship as a status an 
individual achieves through performance. 
Accepting that tax law relies upon a non-legalistic view of citizen-
ship requires unpacking the very concept of citizenship. Citizenship is, in 
some ways, a deceptively complex concept. At first blush it may seem to 
be limited to a legal status that creates a clear division between citizens 
and noncitizens. Yet citizenship is more than a formal legal status.55 A 
brief survey of social theory understandings of citizenship illustrates the 
complexity of citizenship as a concept and provides a point of departure 
for developing a nuanced concept of citizenship in tax. 
  
as gains from investment property or activities) should be taxed at lower rates. The rationale behind 
a preferential rate is the subject of a healthy body of scholarship. The statutory definition of capital 
assets that gives rise to capital gains is found at I.R.C. § 1221 (2012) and the rate schedule in I.R.C. 
§ 1(h) (2012). 
 53. See STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE 
TAXATION 122–25 (8th ed. 2012) (providing an introduction to the topic debt and equity with an eye 
toward its importance for tax law). Subchapter C of the Internal Code provides the law governing 
taxation of corporations but does little to distinguish debt and equity. See generally Shu-Yi Oei & 
Diane Ring, Human Equity? Regulating the New Income Share Agreements, 68 VAND. L. REV. 681 
(2015) (providing a recent discussion of the challenges of sorting debt from equity in the realm of 
income share agreement). 
 54. For example, consider I.R.C. § 302 (2012), a corporate tax provision that determines 
whether a sale of shareholder stock back to a corporation for property or cash or a partial liquidation 
that results in a distribution to shareholder should be taxed as an exchange or a dividend. To distin-
guish between redemptions and dividends the section uses a mix of safe harbor rules and standards. 
See id. 
 55. See Irene Bloemraad et al., Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, 
and Challenges to the Nation-State, 34 ANN. REV. SOC., Aug. 2008, at 153, 155 (providing citizen-
ship may be analyzed simply as status but an extensive and diverse literature recognizes that legal 
status does not fully explain citizenship); id. (“Citizenship debates today continue to reflect tensions 
between citizenship as participation, political or otherwise, and citizenship as legal status, with or 
without accompanying rights and obligations.”); see also Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Introduction 
to THE HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP: A SLIPPERY CONCEPT, supra note 2, at 1–2 (stating that on 
the one hand “citizenship is a legal status through which the individual can access rights and goods 
in the state of her nationality or nationalities,” but also, that “citizenship [is not] a simple binary 
entity that one either possesses or does not; citizenship can be partial, soft, obscured by political 
realities, or nonexistent”). 
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Sociologists define citizenship generally as a concept that groups 
individuals into geographical and political communities.56 That sociolog-
ical concept of citizenship is then further deconstructed into potentially 
but not necessarily overlapping parts57: “[1] legal status, [2] rights, [3] 
political and other forms of participation in society, and [4] a sense of 
belonging.”58 Full citizenship, then, is the presence or exercise of each of 
these four aspects. Certain disciplines may, however, elevate one form of 
citizenship over others. Law, for example, may elevate legal status and 
access to rights over participation or belonging. An individual may have 
formal legal status but lack a sense of belonging, thereby existing in a 
type of “second-class citizenship.”59 Alternately, a sense of belonging 
and acceptance by one’s community may provide a basis for achieving 
formal legal status as a citizen.60 
Anthropologists take a slightly different approach, instead focusing 
on the ways in which law shapes and reflects culture. Influential legal 
anthropologist Sally Falk Moore, herself both a trained attorney and an-
thropologist, identified three general approaches anthropology61 takes in 
its study of law that inform the discussion of citizenship and the law: 
  
 56. See generally Bloemraad et al., supra note 55; Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 2 
(“[C]itizenship in its sociological sense [is] that set of practices (juridicial, political, economic and 
cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society. . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 57. Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 154, 157 (“Citizenship is usually defined as a form of 
membership in a political and geographic community. It can be disaggregated into four dimensions: 
legal status, rights, political and other forms of participation in society, and a sense of belonging. 
The concept of citizenship allows us to analyze the extent to which immigrants and their descendants 
are incorporated into receiving societies.”). These oft-cited dimensions derive from T.H. MARSHALL, 
CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1950). 
 58. Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 154 (providing an excellent review of trends in socio-
logical study of citizenship and potential avenues for future research). 
 59. Id. at 162; see also Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 17–18 (“So citizenship is slip-
pery, even though, legally speaking, you are a citizen or you are not. . . . Citizenship rights can vary 
by ‘race,’ ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, stage of life, or social status. . . . And it is much 
easier to slide down the slippery slope of citizenship rights than to climb back up again.”). For a 
discussion on the influence of belonging on citizenship, see Faist, supra note 2, at 196 (“A third 
component of citizenship is affiliation. It concerns the buttressing of the political and legal dimen-
sions through expressive and moral components articulated, for example, through feelings of belong-
ing to a collectivity such as a nation. . . . This third dimension highlights the fact that citizenship is 
not solely based on relations between states and citizens, that relations among citizens are decisive 
for guaranteeing equal political liberties, rights and obligations.”). See generally Martha T. 
McCluskey, Razing the Citizen: Economic Inequality, Gender, and Marriage Tax Reform, in 
GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 267, 267–85 (Linda C. McClain 
& Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009) (discussing gender and dependency as a less-than citizenship). 
 60. See Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 162 (“Conversely, participation in the labor market 
or business sector, payment of taxes, participation in local schools, raising families, or other activi-
ties that make people an integral part of their local communities and institutions can be understood 
as a form of participatory citizenship that allows immigrants to make citizenship-like claims on the 
state and others, even in the absence of legal citizenship status, and perhaps even in the absence of 
legal residence.” (citation omitted)). 
 61. Though Anthropology is, at its core, a descriptive discipline, it has a complicated political 
and social history arising from the normative judgments of its scholars (whether implicit or explicit) 
and the roles it has played as both challenger and supporter of colonial and post-colonial regimes. Its 
work on citizenship as a concept can, however, provide helpful insights. 
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“law as culture,” “law as domination,” and “law as problem solver.”62 
When we narrow our view from law broadly to legal definitions of citi-
zenship specifically, each of these three anthropological understandings 
of law holds a potential insight. 
Law or citizenship as culture suggests that each definition of citi-
zenship within law reflects and supports a broader cultural understanding 
of belonging. When one views law as culture, the laws of citizenship 
may be understood as social phenomenon or a “social dynamic” not un-
like race or gender.63 Whether a definition of citizenship comes from 
immigration or tax law, it provides insight into the culturally contingent 
categories of us/them as it structures those categories, either by reifying 
or challenging them. Anthropology that advances the law as culture view 
may see legal definitions of citizenship as mirrors of the culture that gave 
rise to those definitions or as part of a common cultural structure that 
reproduces itself across disciplines and realms within that cultural con-
text. Regardless of if one takes the interpretivist64 or structural-
functionalist view,65 the core idea—that law is both a product of and 
plays a constitutive role in its cultural context—is consistent. 
Citizenship as domination suggests the laws of citizenship may par-
ticipate in a disciplining or exploitative project of those with less power 
by those with more.66 Certainly, immigration laws may be used to delib-
erately shape individual behavior or exclude groups from membership 
within a given community because of discriminatory views or as part of 
  
 62. Sally Falk Moore, Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 
1949–1999, 7 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 95, 96–97 (2001); see also ROSEN, supra note 1, 
at 6–7 (writing in his brief but rich introduction to legal anthropology on the tendency of lawyers to 
understand the law as something apart from culture: “When we hear a court speak of ‘the conscience 
of the community,’ ‘the reasonable man,’ or ‘the clear meaning of the statute,’ when we watch 
judges grapple with parenthood as a natural or functional phenomenon, or listen to counsel debate 
whether surrogate motherhood or a frozen embryo should be thought of in terms of ‘ownership,’ we 
know that the meaning of these concepts will come not just from the experience of legal officials or 
some inner propulsion of the law but from those broader assumptions, reinforced across numerous 
domains, that characterize the culture of which law is a part”). The “we” in this statement seems to 
be anthropologists but may also include legal scholars. Certainly there is disagreement within the 
legal academy, much less the tax academy, as to the extent to which law is culturally-contingent. 
 63. See Andrew Kipnis, Anthropology and the Theorisation of Citizenship, 5 ASIA PAC. J. 
ANTHROPOLOGY 257, 258 (2004). 
 64. Geertz was a highly influential anthropologist writing in this area. For an example of such 
work, see CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 1, 6–13 (1973) (discussing his 
view of the goal of anthropology and famously discussing the possible ways of analyzing a wink). 
 65. For key works in the structural-functionalist literature, see generally V.W. TURNER, 
SCHISM AND CONTINUITY IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY: A STUDY OF NDEMBU VILLAGE LIFE (1957); 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Analysis in Linguistics and Anthropology, in STRUCTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 31 (Clair Jacobson & Brooke Grundfest Shoepf trans., Basic Books 1963) (1945). 
 66. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (seeing power as part of a structure great-
er than individuals themselves, Foucault would, to a degree, deny agency to even those ostensibly in 
positions of power); Assaf Likhovski, “Training in Citizenship”: Tax Compliance and Modernity, 
32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 665 (2007) (suggesting that a possible link between tax compliance and the 
construction of modern nation states and citizenry can be found in the Foucauldian-type disciplining 
of the individual through mechanisms of compliance). 
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exploitative aims. Take, for example, the process of shifting toward us-
ing a heavily-racialized concept of “illegality” to exclude targeted groups 
of immigrants from arriving or staying in the United States.67 However, 
this Article takes the view that the concepts of citizenship found in tax 
are not shaped by any intentional animus. However, the disciplining role 
of law is relevant in the citizenship realm to the extent that legal re-
quirements for obtaining citizenship, by their very nature, direct an indi-
vidual’s behavior if she desires naturalized citizenship status. Laws de-
fining citizenship in immigration and tax thus play a role in disciplining 
individual behavior in the citizenship as domination view. 
Law as problem solver derives from the ethnographic work on dis-
pute resolution that was a focus of early legal anthropology. The law as 
problem solver view holds that “law is a problem-solving, conflict-
minimizing device, consciously arrived at through rational 
thought . . . .”68 Stated differently, law takes the place of violent conflict 
as a tool for resolving disputes. Where citizenship intersects with tax, the 
greatest potential conflict is over competing sovereigns who both desire 
to tax a given individual. Citizenship, in this conflict, represents a poten-
tially relevant legal category for resolving that conflict based upon rec-
ognized principles such as justice, administrability, fairness, or sover-
eignty. Indeed, attempting to resolve double taxation that could result 
from two sovereigns that both assert the right to tax an individual’s in-
come is a core challenge of international tax law and its system of trea-
ties.69 The law as problem solver view advances what is a commonly-
  
 67. NICHOLAS DE GENOVA, WORKING THE BOUNDARIES: RACE, SPACE AND “ILLEGALITY” IN 
MEXICAN CHICAGO 228–29 (2005) (“The treatment of ‘illegality’ as an undifferentiated, transhistor-
ical thing-in-itself colludes with state power in creating a remarkable visibility of ‘illegal immi-
grants’ swirling enigmatically around the stunning invisibility of the law.”); see also Miller, supra 
note 33, at 652–53 (noting a shift within immigration law terminology fits within the anthropological 
view that law can be deployed to exclude). Miller notes that deportable (removable) aliens were, up 
until the 1970s, known instead as “convicted aliens.” Miller, supra note 33, at 652. The more com-
mon, contemporary term is now “criminal” or “illegal” aliens. As Miller notes, the term “criminal 
alien” is arguably “more pejorative” than “convicted alien” which “emphasizes the past nature of the 
criminal conviction.” Id. 
 68. Moore, supra note 62, at 97. 
 69. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOLLOW THE MONEY 11 (2016) (“[T]he fundamental dilemma of 
international taxation that confronted Thomas Sewall Adams, his Treasury colleagues, and the 
Congress in the infancy of the income tax remains essentially unchanged. When income is earned in 
one country by a citizen or resident of another country, both the country where the income is earned 
(the source country) and the country where the investor or earner resides (the residence country) 
have legitimate claims to tax the income. The basic task of international tax rules is to resolve the 
competing claims . . . in order to avoid the double taxation that results when both fully exercise their 
taxing power.”); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Pro-
posal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1305–06 (1996) (discussing the origins of our cur-
rent system and noting “[i]n 1923, a committee of four economists submitted a report to the League 
of Nations that set out the basic principles underlying international tax jurisdiction for the first time. 
The report pointed out that an income tax based on ability to pay does not answer the question of 
whose ability to pay is to be considered in each taxing jurisdiction. To answer this question, the 
report developed the ‘doctrine of economic allegiance,’ which underlies modern discussions of 
jurisdiction to tax. Fundamentally, the report endorsed two bases for economic allegiance, which 
justify a country’s imposition of tax: where income is produced (the source jurisdiction) and where it 
is consumed or saved (the residence jurisdiction).”); id. at 1311–12 (discussing the preference for 
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held understanding of the law generally and citizenship in tax specifical-
ly.70 Though it is an important view, the focus of this Article is on ex-
panding our understanding of citizenship in tax beyond the traditional 
view.71 As such, law as culture and law as domination or discipline are 
more important to that project. 
Law as culture and law as domination/discipline ground the sub-
stance of citizenship outside formal legal status. That laws regarding 
citizenship reflect and create the boundaries of citizenship, suggests that 
the legal status of citizen is a label of a set of behaviors or socially as-
cribed characteristics. Social theory suggests that those behaviors or 
characteristics that create citizenship arise from the foundational idea 
that citizenship represents a bargain between the government and its 
people.72 The relationship between the State and its citizens is one of 
mutual obligation.73 This two-way street of rights and responsibilities 
  
residence as applied to individuals rather than businesses). See generally AVI-YONAH ET AL., supra 
note 9, at 1, 18, 31; Allison Christians, Measuring a Fair Share, BIG PICTURE (Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/68ti0095.pdf; Christians, supra note 13. 
 70. See infra Part III; see also Moore, supra note 62, at 97 (“This rationalist framework is 
widely used in the legal profession . . . .”). 
 71. Again, this effort situates this Article squarely within the fiscal sociology project. Fiscal 
sociology projects utilize a similarly interdisciplinary approach to situate tax in its historical, cultur-
al, and social contexts in different countries. For an introduction to this literature, see generally 
Martin et al., supra note 48, at 1. 
 72. See Charles Tilly, Foreword to THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN 
COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 48, at xi (discussing the influence of 
Locke’s theory of social contract). John Locke addressed the social contract and, specifically, the 
need for an authority to tax in his Second Treatise of Civil Government:  
Tis true governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one 
who enjoys a share of the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the 
maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent, i.e., the consent of the ma-
jority giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them. For if any 
one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and 
without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, 
and subverts the end of government. For what property have I in that which another may 
by right take when he pleases to himself? 
Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 140 (1690)). For a discus-
sion going beyond Locke, see NIALL FERGUSON, THE CASH NEXUS 79 (2001) (“Ever since the time 
of ancient Athens, the link between taxation and political representation has been the crux of democ-
racy . . . .”); AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, POLITICS, 
AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 1877–1929, at 13 (2013) (describing the historical origins 
of progressive taxation and noting that “[t]ax reform, simply put, was used to reconfigure the rela-
tionship between citizens and the state. It was used to renegotiate the ‘imagined community’ of the 
modern American polity.”). 
 73. Compare Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 156 (“A more expanded understanding of 
legal citizenship focuses on the rights that accompany citizenship. This perspective, dominant in 
much theorizing on citizenship, resonates with liberalism’s understanding of the relationship be-
tween individuals and the state as a contract in which both sides have rights and obligations. To 
maintain the citizenship contract, the state guarantees basic rights to individuals, while the individual 
has the obligation to pay taxes, complete compulsory education, and obey the laws of the country. 
The rights approach holds out the promise of full equality before the law for all members of a state 
but leaves unresolved how to transform formal into substantive equality.” (citations omitted)), with 
Audrey Macklin, Sticky Citizenship, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP: A SLIPPERY CONCEPT, 
supra note 2, at 223 (discussing the recent problem of “sticky citizenship” in the modern era and 
noting that “[f]ew legal duties specifically attach to citizenship in the many states that have abol-
ished conscription. The benefits of citizenship seem easily to outweigh its burdens . . . .”). Though 
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creates the potential for distinguishing between good and bad actors. A 
State may default on its agreement to provide goods and services, just as 
a citizen may not hold up her end of the bargain.74 Empirical work sup-
ports the theoretical work that views citizenship as more than legal sta-
tus.75 The action or inaction that distinguishes good citizens from bad is 
the most important aspect for this Article, because it makes evident that 
there is a distinction between formal citizenship—defined here as having 
legal status as a citizen of a country—and performative citizenship—
defined here as meeting socially and culturally required expectations of 
citizenship and belonging.76 
Distinguishing between formal and performative citizenship allows 
us to recognize more nuance in the concept of citizenship and, in turn, 
the different concepts at play in doctrine. For example, an individual may 
have formal citizenship but may not engage in “active citizenship.” Tak-
en from literature on development policy, “active citizenship” requires 
formal status as well as participation in government and/or community.77 
Scholars distinguish between formal citizenship and “meaningful citizen-
ship”78 or “substantive citizenship” to draw attention to individuals who 
may have formal status but are effectively—either deliberately or 
through structural violence79––denied the full rights of citizenship. Each 
of these concepts emphasizes different aspects of what we mean when 
we say citizenship but distill into a single idea: confining citizenship to a 
formal, legal status ignores much of its substance. 
  
Macklin makes the statement in the context of addressing why we might be concerned with sticky 
citizenship—citizenship that remains with a person after not being desired—the statement, if correct, 
weakens the assertion that citizenship is truly a mix of roughly equal burdens and benefits. See 
LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP 8 (1998) (discussing the fiction of the assumption of burden in exchange for the bene-
fits of citizenship); id. (“It is rather a wonderfully dynamic fiction. Except for naturalized citizens, 
there is no particular moment when most individuals can be said to assume obligations to the state. 
Instead we take consent as implied by our failure to refuse (to pay taxes, for example . . . ) and by 
continued acceptance of services the state provides.”). 
 74. See generally MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE (1989); McCluskey, supra note 
59, at 267–85. 
 75. See RECONSIDERING THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 159–63 (George E. Marcus & Russell 
L. Hanson eds., 1993) (discussing how individuals may not agree on what duties citizenship compels 
or how one distinguishes between a good citizen and a bad citizen but the general division, and the 
extra-legal concept of citizenship that it implies, is observable). 
 76. Different areas of scholarship embrace the term performative citizenship. I do not intend 
to draw upon all the different uses of the term found therein, but instead limit the term to the defini-
tion provided above. See, e.g., Kathryn R. Abrams, Performative Citizenship in the Civil Rights and 
Immigrant Rights Movements (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2409971, 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409971 (for a different use). See generally 
DARREN J. O’BYRNE, THE DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP: POLITICAL IDENTITY BEYOND THE 
NATION-STATE 191–201 (2003). 
 77. Matthew Clarke & Bruce Missingham, Guest Editors’ Introduction: Active Citizenship 
and Social Accountability, 19 DEV. PRAC. 955, 955 (2009). 
 78. McCluskey, supra note 59, at 270, 276–77. 
 79. See generally PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR (2005), for an extended discussion of structural violence and its impact 
on healthcare and human rights; Paul Farmer, An Anthropology of Structural Violence, 45 CURRENT 
ANTHROPOLOGY 305 (2004). 
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The proposition that citizenship has a performative aspect may, to 
many, seem uncontroversial. The simple fact that an individual may be-
come a naturalized citizen in the United States80—that she may acquire 
citizenship outside of the common avenues of jus sanguinis (by blood) or 
jus soli (by birthright) citizenship81—implies that citizenship can be 
earned. Stated differently, the mere option of naturalized citizenship as-
sumes that one can “behave like” a citizen. But tax is an area that, how-
ever necessary standards may be, frequently expresses a preference for 
rules, predictability, and clear distinctions over subjective analyses of 
intent or, in the context of citizenship, belonging. Formally, if briefly, 
examining the broader social theory concept of citizenship opens the 
door to recognizing that tax, despite its preference for clear lines, utilizes 
both a formal and performative understanding of citizenship. 
Lending further support to the concept of performative citizenship is 
the fact that it surfaces outside social theory. Op-eds read that 
“[d]emocratic citizens owe it to each other to vote.”82 Discussions on 
immigration reform speak of earning citizenship.83 In his 2013 com-
mencement speech at Ohio State University, President Barack Obama 
drew upon a sense of performative citizenship, saying: 
Consider that graduates of this university serve their country through 
the Peace Corps, and educate our children through established pro-
grams like Teach for America, startups like Blue Engine, often earn-
ing little pay for making the biggest impact. Some of you have al-
ready launched startup companies of your own. And I suspect that 
those of you who pursue more education, or climb the corporate lad-
der, or enter the arts or science or journalism, you will still choose a 
cause that you care about in your life and will fight like heck to real-
ize your vision. 
There is a word for this. It’s citizenship.84 
  
 80. Compare RUTH MANDEL, COSMOPOLITAN ANXIETIES: TURKISH CHALLENGES TO 
CITIZENSHIP AND BELONGING IN GERMANY (2008) (discussing ethnographic exploration jus sangui-
nis principles in historical German citizenship law), with Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 6 
(“Citizenship is further complicated by the legal statuses of jus soli, or right of the soil, that is, citi-
zenship by virtue of having been born in a particular place, as opposed to jus sanguinis, or the right 
of the blood, citizenship by virtue of bloodline or inheritance of a parent’s citizenship status.”). See 
also Dual Citizenship in Germany: Jus Sanguinis Revisted, ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21572822-how-not-treat-people-more-one-passport-jus-
sanguinis-revisited. 
 81. See Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 156; see also Howard-Hassmann, supra note 55, at 
6 (noting that the United States grants citizenship on the basis of jus soli principles). 
 82. Lisa Hill, What We’ve Seen in Australia with Mandatory Voting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/11/07/should-voting-in-the-us-be-mandatory-
14/what-weve-seen-in-australia-with-mandatory-voting. 
 83. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Bill for Young Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/19immig.html?_r=0. 
 84. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Spring Commencement Speech at The Ohio State Univer-
sity (May 5, 2013) (transcript), 
https://www.osu.edu/index.php?q=features/2013/obamacommencement.html. 
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Here President Obama appeals to the idea that citizenship is some-
thing you do, not just a status you possess. And these are simply a few of 
many examples of such rhetoric on the performative aspect of citizen-
ship. 
A nation constructs its citizenry through a number of means, of 
which law is one.85 This relatively brief discussion of citizenship and 
social theory yields two important insights for the purposes of this Arti-
cle. First, citizenship is not only a formal legal status but also a social 
practice that individuals perform to varying degrees. These formal and 
performative concepts of citizenship exist within tax and immigration 
law as avenues for accomplishing different goals. Second, law both re-
flects and constitutes the culture in which it is imbedded. Both insights 
from social theory lay the groundwork for arguing that tax law has a di-
rect and indirect role in defining citizenship. The definition of tax resi-
dence, which, in turn, identifies tax citizens is one example. When citi-
zenship is understood as more than a formal legal status, laws that do not 
define citizenship on their face can be seen in a new light. Such laws, as 
they rely upon behaviors that constitute performative citizenship to allo-
cate the taxpaying burden of citizenship, can be seen as part of a broader 
social project of constructing citizenship. 
III. DEFINING THE TAX-IMMIGRATION NEXUS 
Both tax law and immigration law create the tax-immigration nexus. 
Armed with a more nuanced concept of citizenship, we are poised to 
recognize the contributions of both areas of law to what I term the tax-
immigration nexus—the network of connections between immigration 
and tax law. Where immigration law relies upon tax offenses to deter-
mine whether an individual is removable or eligible for citizenship, it 
creates multiple points of connection between the separate areas of law. 
Similarly, when tax uses immigration and citizenship categories to assess 
taxability and tax liability, it contributes to the tax-immigration nexus.86 
This Part defines and describes the tax-immigration nexus, therein 
providing the groundwork for analyzing the implications of that nexus 
for tax law and policy in Part IV. 
A. Citizenship in Immigration Law 
Citizenship, immigration, and naturalization laws define who is and 
can be a formal member of a national community. Unsurprisingly, these 
laws have changed over time and reflect the shifting attitudes of voting 
  
 85. DE GENOVA, supra note 67, at 227 (noting “law’s productivity”); Stumpf, supra note 33, 
at 398 (“Immigration law defines membership . . . by establishing a ladder of accession to permanent 
resident and then formal U.S. citizenship, and a set of criteria to determine whether an individual 
meets the requirements . . . .”). 
 86. As this Article focuses on the implications of tax-immigration nexus for tax law and 
policy, I chose tax-immigration nexus rather than the equally valid immigration-tax nexus. 
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citizens and the government.87 Immigrants seeking U.S. citizenship must 
meet the requirements set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
that range from filing necessary forms to establishing good moral charac-
ter.88 A comprehensive discussion of the requirements for entry to the 
U.S., acquisition of LPR status, and naturalization is beyond the scope of 
this Article. Instead, this Article focuses on the connections between tax 
and these requirements. Where immigration law draws on tax, it is doing 
so with one apparent goal: to determine if an individual is the type of 
citizen “we” collectively desire. Essentially, immigration law uses tax 
compliance or noncompliance as a proxy for determining whether an 
individual would be a good citizen or, in the terms of social theory, 
whether an individual is performing her citizenship. The role, then, of tax 
offenses in constructing citizens is one where tax offenses are foot sol-
diers in the immigration law task of regulating immigration and citizen-
ship. Examining the scope of tax crimes that may result in removal flesh-
es out the behaviors that we expect of citizens and the seriousness with 
which we view transgressions. 
Recall that the focus of this Article is on the tax-immigration nexus 
and its impact on LPRs. Accordingly, considering each of the potential 
points of intersection of immigration and tax law within the life of a giv-
en LPR provides a helpful framework for understanding the nexus. Imag-
ine Ishita, a lawful permanent resident living in South Carolina. Ishita 
has been living in South Carolina for five years, the required statutory 
period for her naturalization.89 Ishita desires to become a naturalized U.S. 
citizen and begins the process of applying for citizenship. 
Assuming Ishita has complied with all tax laws, Ishita may only be-
come aware of the tax-immigration nexus upon beginning her naturaliza-
  
 87. MIGRATION POLICY INST., MAJOR U.S. IMMIGRATION LAWS, 1790–PRESENT (2013), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/timeline-1790. Examining even this relatively straightfor-
ward timeline illustrates the impact of historical and cultural context on immigration laws. Citizen-
ship was, for example, granted only to “free white persons” or revoked from women who married 
foreign nationals. See KERBER, supra note 73, at 81–92 (discussing the story of two sisters arguing 
for women’s right to vote as a “privilege of citizenship;” arguing, in part, that their status as taxpay-
ers justified their right to full citizenship). See generally KEVIN JOHNSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING 
IMMIGRATION LAW 459–507 (2009); Peter F. Asaad, A Selected History of Immigration Law and Its 
Relationship to Modern Immigration Law and Policy, in WHAT EVERY LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW 
ABOUT IMMIGRATION LAW 17–32 (Jennifer A. Hermansky & Kate Kalmykov eds., 2014). 
 88. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012) (detailing the requirements for naturalization). 
 89. Id. § 1427(a) (“Residence[––]No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, 
shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his applica-
tion for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preced-
ing the date of filing his application has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least 
half of that time, and who has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the 
United States in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has resided 
continuously within the United States from the date of the application up to the time of admission to 
citizenship, and (3) during all the periods referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person 
of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well 
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.”). 
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tion application. If she has received assistance on her path to citizenship, 
however, she may understand how important tax compliance is to citi-
zenship.90 The means by which immigration authorities obtain her com-
pliance information is routine and well known in tax: a simple, though 
lengthy, form. Though seemingly mundane, naturalization forms provide 
ready evidence of the tax-immigration nexus. An LPR seeking naturali-
zation must complete the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), a part of the Department of Homeland Security, Form N-400. 
Among a host of other questions spanning topics from marital history to 
voting activity, Part 12 of the form (Additional Information) asks appli-
cants three tax-related questions.91 
Excerpt from Form N-400: 
The questions center upon compliance, both payment and filing, and 
proper characterization of the applicant as either a nonresident—a tax 
category—or permanent resident—an immigration category. Agency 
factsheets further emphasize the importance of tax compliance on the 
path to naturalization.92 Though only a part of the assessment of eligibil-
ity for citizenship,93 the presence of the questions in Part 12 and the em-
phasis seen in unofficial explanatory materials, evince the importance of 
tax compliance in sorting “good” would-be citizens from “bad.” Tax is 
special. By including questions regarding tax compliance, the USCIS is 
attempting to establish whether we, as a society, would want Ishita as a 
fellow citizen. If Ishita is compliant with the tax laws, these three ques-
  
 90. Practice area guides give varying levels of information on the connection between tax and 
immigration. See Vlad Frants & Brandon D. Hadley, Tax Rules for Immigration Law Practitioners, 
in WHAT EVERY LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT IMMIGRATION LAW, supra note 87, at 495–507. 
This text is published by the ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. Chapter 
18 of this same text specifically lists tax compliance as a relevant consideration to the good moral 
character assessment aspiring citizens face. Jennifer A. Hermansky, U.S. Citizenship and Naturaliza-
tion, in WHAT EVERY LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT IMMIGRATION LAW, supra note 87, at 361. 
 91. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Form N-400: 
Application for Naturalization (Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/n-
400.pdf.  
 92. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Thinking About 
Applying for Naturalization?: Use This List to Help You Get Ready! (Nov. 2016), 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Office%20of 
%20Citizenship/Citizenship%20Resource%20Center%20Site/Publications/PDFs/G-1151.pdf (“Have 
you reported your income on your income tax forms? Your tax returns are very important proof that 
you are eligible for naturalization. On the day of your interview, bring certified tax returns for the 
last 5 years (3 years if you are married to a U.S. citizen). Certified tax transcripts may be ordered by 
using Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 4506-T available at www.irs.gov or calling 1-800-829-
1040.”). 
 93. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1381 (2012) (listing offenses that may bar admission or naturaliza-
tion or result in deportation). 
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tions will provide no bar to her naturalization—she has checked one box 
on the good citizen checklist. If she is not, however, she may experience 
the full-force of the tax-immigration nexus through any of three immi-
gration concepts: aggravated felony, crime of moral turpitude, or the 
concept of good moral character. 
1. Grounds for Removal: Tax Crimes as Aggravated Felonies and 
Crimes of Moral Turpitude 
Considering the most damning use of tax offenses in immigration 
first takes us to § 1104(a)(43)(M), the INA section defines an “aggravat-
ed felony.” Clause (ii) of subparagraph M identifies a specific offense as 
an aggravated felony—§ 7201 tax evasion94 where the government loses 
more than $10,000—while clause (i) describes a class of crimes: crimes 
“involv[ing] fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims 
exceeds $10,000.”95 Thus, only one of the two clauses is, by its terms, 
tax specific. Paragraph 43 then continues its voluminous list of potential 
aggravated felonies without another mention of tax crimes. As intro-
duced in Part I, Kawashima broadened the range of tax crimes that can 
count as aggravated felonies under the INA, thus deepening this point of 
connection in the tax-immigration nexus. Committing an aggravated 
felony at any point after admission renders an LPR removable, meaning 
the consequences of being found guilty of these offenses is profound.96 
Looking to the substance of the offenses that qualify gives a better sense 
of the scope of this part of the tax-immigration nexus and the conduct 
that immigration law believes makes for a “bad” citizen. 
Section 7201 defines the “capstone” offense of tax evasion as fol-
lows: 
  
 94. Section 7201 is discussed further infra Part III. The statutory language defines the crime 
and potential penalties:  
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by 
this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be 
guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 
($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, to-
gether with the costs of prosecution. 
I.R.C. § 7201 (2012). 
 95. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (2012). Interestingly, the required financial loss was greater 
before a 1996 change in law. In that year, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996 lowered the (a)(43) amounts from $200,000 to $10,000. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (2012)); 
see also Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 497 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that an 
LPR could quickly reach the required threshold: “Nor would the $10,000 threshold set in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(M) prevent deportation for tax crimes far less serious than willful tax evasion, for as 
many as six years may be included in the amount-of-loss calculation”). 
 96. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (listing classes of “deportable aliens”). The consequences of an 
aggravated felony differ depending upon the immigration status of an individual. The Supreme Court 
notes that deportation (or removal) has consistently been recognized as a “particularly severe ‘penal-
ty.’” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (addressing whether an individual was entitled 
to post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to inform 
him of the collateral immigration consequences of his guilty plea in an unrelated crime). 
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Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat 
any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition 
to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon 
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 
in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or 
both, together with the costs of prosecution.97 
In subsequent sections, Congress articulated lesser-included offens-
es such as the failure to file a return or pay tax.98 The relationship of the-
se lesser-included offenses to tax evasion is a matter of scholarly and 
prosecutorial interest but is not particularly relevant here.99 Most im-
portant for this Article is the key takeaway that these offenses target will-
ful, fraudulent attempts to evade assessment of payment of tax liabil-
ity.100 
Taking Kawashima alongside the INA makes clear that tax compli-
ance is a significant aspect of performing and being eligible for citizen-
ship. So significant, in fact, that committing a tax crime justifies both 
closing the door to citizenship and uprooting an individual from the 
community to which she may have belonged for decades. This outcome, 
though severe, may be appropriate. Perhaps flagging “bad” tax citizens 
as “bad” citizens by use of aggravated felonies is right as a matter of 
immigration policy.101 Many may wish the same fate on U.S. citizens 
who regularly flout the income tax laws.102 But does the same logic re-
main true as the offense becomes less grave or, as in the case of civil 
penalties, may be due to inadvertent noncompliance? 
Aggravated felonies are not the only crimes that result in removal. 
INA § 1227(a)(2) states that an LPR who commits a crime of moral tur-
  
 97. I.R.C. § 7201. 
 98. See I.R.C. § 7203 (2012) (“Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax 
or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep 
any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make 
such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or 
regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, 
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corpora-
tion), or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution. In the case 
of any person with respect to whom there is a failure to pay any estimated tax, this section shall not 
apply to such person with respect to such failure if there is no addition to tax under section 
6654 or 6655 with respect to such failure. In the case of a willful violation of any provision 
of section 6050I, the first sentence of this section shall be applied by substituting ‘felony’ for ‘mis-
demeanor’ and ‘5 years’ for ‘1 year.’”). 
 99. See generally OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, CRIMINAL TAX DIV., TAX CRIMES HANDBOOK 
(2009), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_crimes_handbook.pdf. 
 100. See I.R.C. § 7201. 
 101. To be clear, I am not arguing in favor of this view. Instead, I am simply acknowledging 
that tax policy is not the only driver in this discussion. Immigration law policymakers must assess 
the degree to which they believe tax compliance is a reliable proxy for “good” citizenship. As the 
next subpart discusses, however, the decisions that immigration policymakers have made have 
import for tax law and policy and, as this Article argues, are particularly problematic when the 
noncompliance is inadvertent. 
 102. This statement was made by many colleagues as this paper was in development, though 
perhaps with tongue in cheek.  
2017] THE TAX-IMMIGRATION NEXUS  221 
pitude within five or ten years of admission that may result in a sentence 
of a year or more, is deportable.103 So too is an LPR with multiple con-
victions of crimes of moral turpitude regardless of whether the crime can 
or does result in imprisonment.104 Courts have defined the bounds of 
crimes of moral turpitude and have regularly considered state and federal 
tax offenses as such.105 A recent Ninth Circuit opinion succinctly sum-
marizes the doctrine: “Crimes of moral turpitude are of basically two 
types, those involving fraud and those involving grave acts of baseness 
or depravity.”106 Tax offenses fall into the former category. In the same 
case, Carty v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit considered whether, under a 
California statute, failure to file a return with a willful intent to evade tax 
was synonymous with intent to defraud, thereby rendering the offense a 
crime of moral turpitude.107 Finding the two to be synonymous, the LPR 
taxpayer remained removable.108 A key insight illustrated by this and 
other similar opinions, is that an offense need not include fraud as a spe-
cific element for the offense to constitute a crime of moral turpitude.109 
Employing an analysis similar to that of the majority opinion in Ka-
washima, courts have found that if fraud is a necessary though unstated 
element of the tax offense, such an offense may be a crime of moral tur-
pitude.110 
  
 103. The time limit depends upon the individual’s particular path to LPR status. For example, 
see 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (2012), which governs residents who are married to U.S. citizens. The statute 
reads:  
Any person whose spouse is a citizen of the United States, or any person who obtained 
status as a lawful permanent resident by reason of his or her status as a spouse or child of 
a United States citizen who battered him or her or subjected him or her to extreme cruel-
ty, may be naturalized upon compliance with all the requirements of this subchapter ex-
cept the provisions of paragraph (1) of section 1427(a) of this title if such person imme-
diately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has resided continu-
ously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for 
at least three years, and during the three years immediately preceding the date of filing 
his application has been living in marital union with the citizen spouse (except in the case 
of a person who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a United States citi-
zen spouse or parent), who has been a United States citizen during all of such period, and 
has been physically present in the United States for periods totaling at least half of that 
time and has resided within the State or the district of the Service in the United States in 
which the applicant filed his application for at least three months. 
Id. 
 104. I.R.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 105. As the Fourth Circuit succinctly stated: “Generally, violations of the federal tax law 
constitute crimes of moral turpitude, which, in turn, demonstrate a lack of good moral character.” El-
Ali v. Carroll, No. 95-1013, 1996 WL 192169, at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996) (per curiam). 
 106. Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 107. Id. at 1082. 
 108. Id. at 1085 (“Having determined that willful failure to file a tax return, with the intent to 
evade taxes, involves fraud, and thus constitutes a crime of moral turpitude, we dismiss the petition 
for lack of jurisdiction.”). 
 109. Id. at 1084 (“We have held that [e]ven if intent to defraud is not explicit in the statutory 
definition, a crime nevertheless may involve moral turpitude if such intent is implicit in the nature of 
the crime.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 110. See Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012); see also Chhabra v. Holder, 444 F. 
App’x 493 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that willful tax evasion met the crime of moral turpitude standard 
because willful evasion requires intent to defraud); Costello v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 
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This broad understanding of crimes of moral turpitude can encom-
pass a number of tax offenses. But a broad sweep may be appropriate 
when considered alongside the limitations on the impact of commission 
of crimes of moral turpitude. An LPR will only be removable for com-
mitting crimes of moral turpitude within a particular limited time frame 
after admission, or if she or he commits multiple offenses. The law, thus, 
seems designed to catch individuals before they are fully entrenched in 
their lives in the United States or, even if they have been performing 
citizenship, if they show themselves to be repeat offenders. This stands 
in contrast to even one commission of an aggravated felony being suffi-
ciently severe to establish bad character. When, however, a crime is con-
sidered a lesser crime of moral turpitude, we need to see a pattern of bad 
actions before we pass judgment on the individual’s character. 
Lawful permanent residents who commit an intentional or willful, 
fraudulent tax offense may not be the most sympathetic group. If tax 
compliance is a significant aspect of performative citizenship—as the 
tax-immigration nexus suggests it is—an offending LPR’s failure to per-
form this aspect of citizenship may outweigh the other social, civic, and 
economic connections that comprise that citizenship. Paired with the 
LPR’s lack of formal citizenship, she finds herself facing a simple equa-
tion “bad tax citizen”=“bad citizen.” But the equation does not necessari-
ly balance as easily when the offenses are civil and the character assess-
ment by immigration authorities is discretionary. In that case, the weight 
of the performative citizenship of an individual and the disproportionate-
ly lenient punishment of formal citizens for the same offense looms 
large. 
2. Grounds for Removal: Taxation and “Good Moral Character” 
Commission of an aggravated felony or crime of moral turpitude 
provides a statutory ground for removal, but the tax-immigration nexus 
goes beyond tax crimes. To be eligible for naturalization, an immigrant 
must be of “good moral character.”111 The fact that no statutory ground 
  
311 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1962) (“There can be no ‘wilful’ evasion without a specific intent to de-
fraud.”), rev’d, 376 U.S. 120 (1964). 
 111. Good moral character is one of multiple requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012) reads: 
(a) Residence[—]No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be 
naturalized unless such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his appli-
cation for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years 
immediately preceding the date of filing his application has been physically present there-
in for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or 
within the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed the ap-
plication for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States 
from the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during 
all the periods referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral 
character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well 
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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for removal exists does not establish that the individual is of good moral 
character.112 Rather, the individual immigrant bears the burden of estab-
lishing good moral character for at least the five years preceding the nat-
uralization application, though conduct outside that period may be rele-
vant as well.113 
Returning to § 1101 of the INA yields a list of behaviors or actions 
that establish statutory poor moral character.114 None of the listed offen-
sive behaviors are tax-related, though there is a cross reference to the 
now familiar definition of aggravated felony which, by its definition, 
includes tax crimes.115 If the § 1101(f) list of behaviors that establish 
poor moral character were exhaustive, subsection (f) would add little to 
the tax-immigration nexus. Flush language in subsection (f) creates a 
“catch-all” category of behavior, however, stating that “[t]he fact that 
any person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a 
finding that for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral 
character.”116 This language opens the door to an even more robust tax-
immigration nexus; a door regularly utilized by immigration authorities 
to cast a range of tax offenses as evidence that an individual lacks the 
requisite good moral character to become a naturalized citizen. 
USCIS can use findings or allegations of civil tax offenses—
violations of law that fall outside the aggravated felony standard rule in 
  
 112. Id. § 1427(d) (“No finding by the Attorney General that the applicant is not deportable 
shall be accepted as conclusive evidence of good moral character.”). 
 113. Id. § 1427(e) (“In determining whether the applicant has sustained the burden of establish-
ing good moral character and the other qualifications for citizenship specified in subsection (a) of 
this section, the Attorney General shall not be limited to the applicant's conduct during the five years 
preceding the filing of the application, but may take into consideration as a basis for such determina-
tion the applicant's conduct and acts at any time prior to that period.”). 
 114. To be precise, these traits or behaviors show a lack of good moral character, the absence 
of which is assumed to be poor moral character. I intend to imply no judgment but rather simply the 
opposite of the required moral character for naturalization. See I.R.C. § 1101(f) (2012) (“For the 
purposes of this chapter—No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral 
character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established, is, or 
was—(1) a habitual drunkard . . . (3) a member of one or more of the classes of persons, whether 
inadmissible or not, described in paragraphs (2)(D), (6)(E), and (10)(A) of section 1182(a) of this 
title; or subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 1182(a)(2) of this title and subparagraph (C) thereof of 
such section [8] (except as such paragraph relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 
grams or less of marihuana), if the offense described therein, for which such person was convicted or 
of which he admits the commission, was committed during such period; (4) one whose income is 
derived principally from illegal gambling activities; (5) one who has been convicted of two or more 
gambling offenses committed during such period; (6) one who has given false testimony for the 
purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter; (7) one who during such period has been con-
fined, as a result of conviction, to a penal institution for an aggregate period of one hundred and 
eighty days or more, regardless of whether the offense, or offenses, for which he has been confined 
were committed within or without such period; (8) one who at any time has been convicted of an 
aggravated felony (as defined in subsection (a)(43) of this section); or (9) one who at any time has 
engaged in conduct described in section 1182(a)(3)(E) of this title (relating to assistance in Nazi 
persecution, participation in genocide, or commission of acts of torture or extrajudicial killings) or 
1182(a)(2)(G) of this title (relating to severe violations of religious freedom).”).  
 115. See id. § 1101(f)(8) (“[O]ne who at any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony 
(as defined in subsection (a)(43) of this section).”). 
 116. Id. § 1101(f) (emphasis added). 
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§ 1101(a)(43)—to establish lack of good moral character.117 Case law in 
the area illustrates two key points: (1) immigration authorities regularly 
use and accept civil tax offenses as evidence of a lack of good moral 
character and (2) no finding of liability is required for the alleged offense 
to count against moral character. Such offenses, ranging from errors in 
assessing liability to failing to pay taxes owed,118 fall under the catch-all 
category of behaviors showing poor moral character under § 1101(f).119 
Detailing a few illustrative examples gives a better sense of the relevance 
of tax compliance to the good moral character assessment. 
The use of civil tax offenses, whether established or alleged,120 to 
challenge an individual’s good moral character is a widespread occur-
rence. Though courts look favorably on a record of payment of taxes,121 
the more frequent use appears to be to cast doubt on an individual’s 
character.122 Circuit courts have confirmed, for example, that failing to 
pay tax owed is an act that is within the immigration judge’s discretion to 
  
 117. 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(1)–(3) (2012). Note the absence of a requirement of conviction or 
charge of unlawful acts, but rather simply that the individual committed acts showing a lack of good 
moral character. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
USCIS POLICY MANUAL, vol. 12, pt. F, ch. 5 (2016), 
https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volume12-PartF-Chapter5.html (“This 
provision does not require the applicant to have been charged or convicted of the offense. An ‘un-
lawful act’ includes any act that is against the law, illegal or against moral or ethical standards of the 
community. The fact that an act is a crime makes any commission thereof an unlawful act.”). 
 118. Okoloji v. Chertoff, No. 3:07CV24(WWE), 2007 WL 1851216, at *1 (D. Conn. June 25, 
2007) (“Failure to pay owed taxes is an unlawful act that adversely reflects upon your moral charac-
ter. In light of the lack of evidence concerning any extenuating circumstances that would have 
caused petitioner’s failure to pay taxes timely, the USCIS found that plaintiff had not sustained his 
burden of proof to establish good moral character during the statutorily prescribed period.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Cardenas-Morfin v. Ashcroft, 87 F. App’x 629, 631 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2004) 
(showing an example of USCIS introducing allegations of tax offenses to negate good moral charac-
ter). 
 120. Id. (“At the hearing, the INS accused Cardenas of intentionally making false statements 
on old tax returns. Although these alleged misrepresentations occurred before the five year statutory 
period for assessing moral character required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B), the IJ nevertheless 
concluded that Cardenas lacked good moral character.”). Though the Ninth Circuit ultimately re-
manded the case for further proceedings, it is illustrative of the tendency of the Immigration Judge to 
accept and immigration authorities to use alleged violations. Id. at 632. 
 121. Angel v. Chertoff, No. 07-cv-168-JPG, 2007 WL 3085962, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2007) 
(“He pays his taxes and employs dozens of workers.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Dominguez-Capistran v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 808, 809 (8th Cir. 2005) (discuss-
ing an example of a court favorably noting that a woman “diligently paid state and federal taxes in 
this country” when considering her cancellation of removal proceedings), vacated, 428 F.3d 876 (8th 
Cir. 2006); see also Abuhekal v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 10–4687 ADM/TNL, 
2011 WL 2600709, at *5 (D. Minn. June 30, 2011); Abulkhair v. Bush, No. 08–CV–5410 
(DMC)(MF), 2010 WL 2521760, at *9 (D.N.J. June 14, 2010) (“The Court notes that failure to file 
tax returns or otherwise comport with civic responsibilities can in some instances prevent a naturali-
zation applicant from demonstrating ‘good moral character.’”), aff’d, 413 F. App’x 502 (3d Cir. Feb. 
9, 2011); Gizzo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., No. 02 Civ. 4879(RCC), 2003 WL 
22110278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2003) (using a prior criminal incidence of noncompliance to 
argue a lack of good moral character; despite the incident being outside the statutory period “[t]he 
District Director stated that a failure to report income constitutes a crime involving moral turpi-
tude”). 
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consider when evaluating good moral character.123 Neither the amount of 
tax owed because of the error being significant nor a legal finding of 
intent to commit the tax offense are requirements for the offense to count 
as a strike against the good moral character of the individual.124 Some-
what concerning is the inconsistency of opinions regarding just how 
much noncompliance is relevant—sometimes errors are sufficient, 
whereas in other instances they are not—an inconsistency that is due to 
the discretionary nature of the moral character assessment.125 Important-
ly, the fact that an individual amends her return to correct any errors will 
not necessarily assist her in immigration proceedings.126 Further, doubts 
as to the relevance of the act on the individual’s moral character will be 
resolved against the applicant.127 Taken together, case law on the use of 
  
 123. See Marji v. Gonzales, 166 F. App’x 197, 200 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2006) (“[F]ailing to pay 
taxes can be grounds for an adverse character finding, [and] the IJ did not err in considering these 
facts.”). 
 124. Sumbundu v. Holder, 602 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 125. Id. (upholding a finding of lack of good moral character where the individuals had a 
history of underreporting where “whatever intent requirement may apply could be found”); El-Ali v. 
Carroll, No. 95-1013, 1996 WL 192169, at *6 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996) (per curiam) (holding where 
errors regarding the address on the return were accepted as evidence of a lack of good moral charac-
ter); Sekibo v. Chertoff, No. H-08-2219, 2010 WL 2196271, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2010) (allow-
ing for some dishonesty regarding compliance and stating “[w]hile it is likely that, for example, 
filing a late tax return one year and then neglecting to acknowledge that fact on a naturalization 
application would not, standing alone, prevent an applicant from showing good moral character, the 
Court finds that failing to file tax returns for five consecutive years and then denying that fact under 
penalty of perjury is not indicative of an applicant with ‘good moral character, attached to the prin-
ciples of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of 
the United States’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012))); Gambino v. Pomeroy, 562 F. Supp. 974, 
985 (D.N.J. 1982) (“The mere existence of errors in tax returns could not rationally be regarded as a 
basis for saying that a petitioner was not of good moral character. Failure to file, however, is quite 
another matter so long as there is any indication of an obligation to file. Continued failure to file is 
even worse.”). For a recent discussion of the good moral character assessment, see Kevin Lapp, 
Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement for U.S. Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 1571, 1574 
(2012) (noting “[USCIS’] current penchant for punitive discretion” and calling for reform). 
 126. Sumbundu, 602 F.3d at 56 (upholding a finding of lack of good moral character where the 
individuals had a history of underreporting where “whatever intent requirement may apply could be 
found”). The Second Circuit also determined that the sum of taxes owed was not determinative. Id. 
The petitioners in the case asserted that, to be a strike against their moral character, the amount owed 
needs to be “substantial.” Id. at 50. The court rejected this argument, stating: “We conclude that 
misrepresenting a ‘substantial sum’ may certainly be a factor in the IJ’s moral character determina-
tion. We nevertheless reject Petitioner’s suggestion that the agency’s discretion under the catchall 
provision is so narrow, as to entail any such requirement.” Id. at 56. 
 127. The discretion given to the courts derives from the fact that naturalized citizenship is 
something an individual earns, as opposed to a given right. See, e.g., United States v. Spohrer, 175 F. 
440, 441–43 (C.C.D.N.J. 1910) (“An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of 
citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon compliance with the prescribed 
conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon 
and after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege is bound, 
therefore, to conform to the terms upon which alone the right he seeks can be conferred.”), cited with 
approval in Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912); see also V. Woerner, Annotation, 
What Constitutes Showing of “Good Moral Character” on the Part of an Applicant for Naturaliza-
tion, 22 A.L.R.2d § 2 (2014) (“Consequently, the courts agree that naturalization is a matter of grace, 
not of right, a privilege to be granted only upon compliance with all the terms prescribed by the 
Congress; that the good moral character requirements continue up to and including the date of final 
hearing upon the petition for naturalization; that the petitioner has the burden of proving good moral 
character; and that all doubts as to his good moral character must be resolved against the petition-
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tax compliance in the good moral character evaluation illustrates that 
noncompliance, or even merely alleged noncompliance with a broad 
range of tax offenses, is held to be a marker of bad character.128 
For each sympathetic petitioner in the cases just cited there is one 
who may seem less so.129 Though many may be unsympathetic to LPRs 
like the Kawashimas, being similarly unsympathetic to the LPRs who 
fall into the good moral character space of the tax-immigration nexus 
seems unnecessarily harsh. Our tax code is notoriously complex and 
there are a multitude of potential footfalls. Indeed, petitioners in many 
good moral character cases note the complexity of the Code and the dif-
ficulty of compliance.130 Should an individual fail to comply, there is 
also a range of civil penalties at the IRS’s disposal to support tax compli-
ance by making noncompliance costly. The Code lays out accuracy and 
fraud penalties including, § 6651 for failure to file a return or pay tax, 
§ 6662 which imposes, in part, penalties for underpayment of tax due to 
negligence or substantial understatements, and a fraud penalty under 
§ 6663 when the Service can show that even part of an understatement is 
due to taxpayer fraud. Even with the help of tax preparation software, it 
is not unreasonable for individuals to make inadvertent mistakes that 
result in noncompliance.131 Financial penalties may be appropriate in 
  
er.”). See generally United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626 (1931), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
 128. The use of the good character requirement (and the aggravated felony and crime of moral 
turpitude concepts used to support it) is to identify “good” citizens. For an express statement of this 
idea, see In re Nybo, 34 F.2d 161, 163 (E.D. Mich. 1929) (“Granting of citizenship is a question 
which must be approached from the standpoint of the advantages to result to this country rather than 
the benefits which would flow to the petitioner.”), aff'd, 42 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1930); Woerner, supra 
note 127, § 2 (“It has been frequently stated, and without dissent, that the purpose of the naturaliza-
tion statutes is to admit to citizenship those aliens who, having met other requirements, it appears 
will make good American citizens.”). Courts struggle with the standard by which to judge moral 
character but the consensus seems to be immigrants should be judged by the “average” citizen and 
morality of the time. For a discussion of the range of cases addressing the standard, see Woerner, 
supra note 127, § 3. Judge Learned Hand, speaking then for the Second Circuit, articulated the 
inherent challenges of such speculation in Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir. 
1949) (“[W]e thought that such conduct did not conform to ‘the generally accepted moral conven-
tions current at the time’; but we added: ‘Left at large as we are, without means of verifying our 
conclusion, and without authority to substitute our individual beliefs, the outcome must needs be 
tentative; and not much is gained by discussion.’”). 
 129. See, e.g., Santana-Albarran v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 699, 706 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Santana-
Albarran argues that the back tax returns are reliable because ‘no one is going to hang a large tax 
liability around his or her neck unless the tax is owed.’ Analogizing to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, he states that filing the tax returns is a statement against interest and therefore is credible 
proof that he was in the country during those times. We find this argument to be wholly unpersua-
sive. One would certainly ‘hang a large tax liability around his or her neck’ if it means that one could 
avoid removal from the country, as was evidenced by the fact that these returns were filed in the first 
place only in response to the IJ's concern.” (citations omitted)). 
 130. See, e.g., Mateo v. Gonzales, 217 F. App’x 476, 485 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2007). 
 131. For example, many business deductions require the taxpayer to maintain adequate records 
to substantiate the business use of an asset, such as a car that may have personal use value as well. 
When the Service attempts to establish fraudulent intent under the civil § 6663 fraud penalty it uses 
“badges of fraud” including failure to maintain adequate records. Morse v. Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 673 (2003). Failing to maintain adequate records may not, alone, be enough to establish fraud 
but can support a finding. Id. But see Gambino, 562 F. Supp. at 985 (“The mere existence of errors 
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such cases, but are all tax offenses sufficiently concerning, or is the evi-
dence required to establish willfulness for civil tax offenses strong 
enough that they should be able to outweigh the myriad of ways in which 
the individual has performed her citizenship (which may include compli-
ance with other tax laws)?132 If the answer from immigration law is yes, 
tax law should respond by evaluating the impact of such grave collateral 
consequences on the fairness of its own laws. 
Understanding the collateral consequences of tax law in immigra-
tion and the extent to which immigration law uses tax as an indication of 
whether an individual is performing her citizenship, give us a sense of 
the tax-immigration nexus from the standpoint of immigration law. At its 
core, the tax-immigration nexus created by immigration law illustrates 
that immigration law uses tax law to help define its view of community. 
Through the tax-immigration nexus, immigration law uses tax to police 
the boundaries of the U.S. community by granting or denying member-
ship to individuals based, in part, on their tax compliance. By including 
questions regarding compliance on the naturalization form, immigration 
law uses the tax-immigration nexus to discipline and train “good citi-
zens” as it requires compliance.133 Thus, the substance of the tax-
immigration nexus that immigration law provides fits well into the per-
formative citizenship mold—citizenship is both a status you have and 
something you do. The next subpart fleshes out tax law’s contribution to 
the tax-immigration nexus. 
B. Citizenship in Tax Law 
Tax law contributes to the tax-immigration nexus in two ways. 
First, by relying upon immigration categories to define the taxable com-
munity—the group from whom the government asserts the right to col-
lect tax—tax law directly creates a point of connection in the nexus. Se-
  
in tax returns could not rationally be regarded as a basis for saying that a petitioner was not of good 
moral character.”). There is, however, no statutory bar to considering errors as evidence of a lack of 
good moral character and, most importantly, tax authorities may use repeated errors to establish an 
intent to defraud the government, as discussed above. 
 132. El-Ali v. Carroll, No. 95-1013, 1996 WL 192169, at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996) (Hall, J., 
concurring) (per curiam) (writing separately and questioning the sufficiency of evidence used to 
establish willfulness in stating: “From the moment of his confrontation with the interview examiner, 
El-Ali has steadfastly denied any wrongdoing. In truth, the only evidence of guilt that the INS has 
before it are El-Ali’s signed tax returns bearing his in-laws’ address; however, that El-Ali intention-
ally signed a tax return containing incorrect information does not mandate a conclusion that he 
specifically intended to deceive or defraud the government by doing so. Indeed, the circumstances in 
this case appear to indicate just the opposite. El-Ali came to this country, diligently found employ-
ment (which he yet retains), started a family, and strove to assist his new father-in-law by purchasing 
a grocery store for him to run. There is abundant evidence in the record from which the trier of fact 
could conclude that El-Ali simply made an innocent mistake, perhaps as a result of giving his father-
in-law too free a rein, or by relying too much on the tax preparer. Moreover, it strains credulity to 
posit that El-Ali would willfully file a false tax return, then, unbidden, bring a copy of it to the 
immigration interview.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 133. Similar overlap has been explored in the context of crimmigration law. For an excellent 
discussion of the importance of such overlap, see Miller, supra note 33, at 617. 
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cond, tax law indirectly deepens the tax-immigration nexus by codifying 
a concept of performative citizenship in its definition of resident alien 
and exclusions therefrom. 
An individual need not have a formal immigration status to be a 
taxpayer. Stated differently, tax citizen and formal citizen need not over-
lap as categories. If we understand citizenship as both formal and per-
formative, this lack of correlation leads to two different but potentially 
overlapping concepts of citizenship. An individual may have one formal 
immigration status as citizen or noncitizen and a separate performative 
citizenship status as a tax citizen. In the simplest case—a U.S. citizen 
living in the United States—citizenship as formal immigration status and 
tax citizen status overlap perfectly—this person is both a U.S. citizen per 
immigration law134 and a “United States person” subject to tax as a citi-
zen under § 7701(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Reality is, as ever, 
a bit more complex. An individual may be present in the United States as 
a noncitizen and still perform her citizenship so as to be classified as a 
tax citizen; owing tax on the same terms as a U.S. citizen.135 LPRs best 
exemplify this lack of overlap by representing a unique mix of formal 
immigration status just shy of citizenship, paired with an extended histo-
ry of performing citizenship in meaningful ways by living, working and 
participating in their local and national communities.136 The fact that 
LPRs fall into the gap between formal and tax citizenship raises concerns 
for tax policy that become evident as one examines tax law’s contribu-
tions to the tax-immigration nexus. 
1. Tax Law’s Direct and Indirect Connections to Immigration Law 
Tax law’s direct contribution to the tax-immigration nexus is readily 
identifiable. Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on 
individuals, but it is § 7701 that clarifies who constitutes an individual 
  
 134. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2012). 
 135. Indeed, LPRs perform their citizenship in more ways than simply owing taxes on the same 
terms as citizens. While LPRs cannot vote, they are required to register for the selective service 
alongside citizens and all other immigrants. For more information on selective service requirements, 
see Immigrants and Dual Nationals, SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., 
https://www.sss.gov/Registration/Immigrants-and-Dual-Nationals (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 136. Certainly individuals whose immigration status is authorized but who do not have LPR 
status or unauthorized immigrants may participate in and contribute to their communities in mean-
ingful ways that track performative citizenship. Indeed, there are numerous studies quantifying the 
contributions unauthorized immigrants make to federal, state, and local revenues. See Lipman, supra 
note 13, at 2; see also Campbell, supra note 26; Juila Preston, Immigrants Aren’t Taking Americans’ 
Jobs, New Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/immigrants-arent-taking-americans-jobs-new-study-
finds.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share&_r=0 (summarizing the economic and 
fiscal consequences of immigration). However, the fact that LPRs have already obtained a necessary 
pre-requisite to citizenship—the green card—means they are further along the path to formal citizen-
ship and, therein, uniquely situated. 
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subject to tax.137 Section 7701 starts by defining a “person” as a natural 
person or individual (as well as trusts, estates, and business entities).138 
Section 7701 also defines the term “taxpayer” as “any person subject to 
any internal revenue tax.”139 Neither of these paragraphs truly gives a 
clear sense of the taxable community. In § 7701(a)(30) the Code begins 
to clarify the boundaries of that community as it defines “United States 
person” as a “citizen or resident of the United States . . . .”140 Through 
subparagraph 30, the Code identifies citizens as falling within the bounds 
of the taxable community while it also adds another category—
resident.141 
The Code defines a resident, specifically a resident alien, in two 
ways. Section 7701(b) sets out these two definitions of resident status, as 
well as provides for an election into such status.142 Clause (i) uses the 
immigration law definition of LPR to identify such persons as tax resi-
dents.143 Clause (ii) sets out a substantial presence test144 while clause 
(iii) provides an election for resident status.145 A nonresident is, by ex-
tension, an individual who fails both the formal and substantial presence 
tests.146 
Section 7701’s core contribution to the nexus begins with clauses (i) 
and (ii). Clause (i) creates tax law’s direct connection to immigration 
law. The connection is direct because it is tax law that forces the overlap 
between an immigration category and a tax result. To define resident 
alien, § 7701(b) uses the immigration category of LPR to identify a taxa-
  
 137. For the purpose of this Article, I am focused on natural persons. Section 1 of the Code 
imposes a tax on individuals and prescribes different rate schedules for persons based upon their 
marital status and whether they care for qualifying dependents. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(d) (2012). 
 138. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2012). 
 139. Id. § 7701(a)(14). 
 140. Id. § 7701(a)(30). 
 141. The regulations clarify beyond any doubt that citizens, resident aliens, and nonresident 
aliens are all part of the taxable community. Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(a)(1) (2008) (“Section 1 of the Code 
imposes an income tax on the income of every individual who is a citizen or resident of the United 
States and, to the extent provided by section 871(b) or 877(b), on the income of a nonresident alien 
individual.”). 
 142. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (“(b) Definition of resident alien and nonresident alien.—(1) In 
general.––For purposes of this title (other than subtitle B)—(A) Resident alien.––An alien individual 
shall be treated as a resident of the United States with respect to any calendar year if (and only if) 
such individual meets the requirements of clause (i), (ii), or (iii).”). 
 143. Id. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (“Lawfully admitted for permanent residence.—Such individual is a 
lawful permanent resident of the United States at any time during such calendar year.”); see also 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(b)–1 (2008) (“An alien is a resident alien with respect to a calendar year if 
the individual is a lawful permanent resident at any time during the calendar year. A lawful perma-
nent resident is an individual who has been lawfully granted the privilege of residing permanently in 
the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws.”). 
 144. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii) (“Substantial presence test.––Such individual meets the sub-
stantial presence test of paragraph (3).”). 
 145. Id. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(iii) (“First year election.––Such individual makes the election provid-
ed in paragraph (4).”). 
 146. Id. § 7701(b)(1)(B) (“Nonresident alien.––An individual is a nonresident alien if such 
individual is neither a citizen of the United States nor a resident of the United States (within the 
meaning of subparagraph (A)).”). See generally I.R.C. § 871 (2012). 
 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:2 230 
ble resident alien.147 Stated simply, the fact that an individual has been 
vetted by and identified as a member of the national community by 
USCIS provides a proxy for membership in the taxable community. 
Thus, a resident alien becomes, by operation of § 7701(b) a tax citizen—
someone understood to be sufficiently enmeshed in the community as to 
be taxable. 
The substantial presence category gives shape to the tax citizen cat-
egory. It does so by making evident the assumptions underlying tax law’s 
use of the LPR status as a proxy for community membership. The second 
clause of § 7701(b)(1)(A) identifies individuals who satisfy the substan-
tial presence test as resident aliens. In doing so, it provides the founda-
tion of tax law’s indirect contribution to the tax-immigration nexus.148 It 
does so by creating another category of tax citizens: individuals who 
attain resident alien status because of their “substantial presence” in the 
United States.149 Jumping ahead to paragraph 3 of the same subsection 
gives the definition of substantial presence—a mechanical test that 
measures the number of days an individual is present over a three-year 
period ending in the current year.150 Exceptions are available to this rule 
for certain individuals, such as students, or for those who are present for 
less than half of the current year and can demonstrate a “closer connec-
tion” to another foreign country.151 
The substantial presence test operates to pull individuals, other than 
formal citizens and LPRs, into the taxable community to render them tax 
citizens. But the substance and outcome of that determination is critically 
important for evaluating the fairness of our tax citizen definition. One of 
a set of fundamental questions of tax policy is who should pay taxes to a 
given government.152 Stated differently, who belongs to the taxable 
  
 147. I.R.C. § 7701(b) (“Definition of resident alien and nonresident alien.—(1) In general.––
For purposes of this title (other than subtitle B)––(A) Resident alien.––An alien individual shall be 
treated as a resident of the United States with respect to any calendar year if (and only if) such indi-
vidual meets the requirements of clause (i), (ii), or (iii): (i) Lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence.––Such individual is a lawful permanent resident of the United States at any time during such 
calendar year.”). 
 148. Id. § 7701(b)(1)(A). We might also characterize tax law’s role in providing immigration 
law grounds for removal or bars to naturalization as indirect as well. Here, however, I confine indi-
rect to decisions made within tax law and policy as opposed to instances when tax law is conscripted 
for use in another area of law. 
 149. Id. § 7701(b)(3)(A). 
 150. Id. The days of the preceding years are weighted to reduce their import. 
 151. Id. § 7701(b)(3)(B) (“Exception where individual is present in the United States during 
less than one-half of current year and closer connection to foreign country is established.––An indi-
vidual shall not be treated as meeting the substantial presence test of this paragraph with respect to 
any current year if––(i) such individual is present in the United States on fewer than 183 days during 
the current year, and (ii) it is established that for the current year such individual has a tax home (as 
defined in section 911(d)(3) without regard to the second sentence thereof) in a foreign country and 
has a closer connection to such foreign country than to the United States.”). 
 152. Christians, supra note 69, at 97 (“This involves a very different and more difficult meas-
urement of the representative whole for the purpose of determining fair shares. It involves first 
identifying whom a government can and should tax. . . . This definition means that deciding what is 
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community? An overly simplistic and revenue-focused answer to that 
question might be that nations should tax everyone they can. Doing so, 
however, would run afoul of a guiding principle of tax policy: fairness. 
Taxing everyone over whom a nation can assert jurisdiction would also 
conflict with international norms and agreements, as well as raise effi-
ciency concerns that could ultimately minimize revenue collection.153 
The question that arises then, is why are resident aliens a part of the tax-
able community?154 The inescapable Supreme Court case of Cook v. 
Tait155 provides an early but incomplete response and points toward rec-
ognizing resident alien status, or tax citizenship, as codified performative 
citizenship. 
2. Benefits and Tax—The Relevance of Cook v. Tait 
Any discussion of citizenship and taxation would be remiss not to 
address the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cook. The case involved a U.S. 
citizen living in Mexico who argued against assessment of income tax 
from property he held in Mexico. In its opinion, the Court rejected a ter-
ritorial limit to the taxing power, holding that citizenship of the individu-
al, not the location of him or his property, was the key concern. In doing 
so, the Court gave credence to the view that the benefits of citizenship 
extend beyond national boundaries156: “[T]he government, by its very 
nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found . . . . [T]he 
basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon the 
situs of the property . . . [nor] upon the domicile of the citizen . . . but 
upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation to the 
latter to him as a citizen.”157 Cook continues to provide a judicial founda-
tion for citizenship taxation as it articulated a strong benefit theory ra-
tionale for the justification to tax and attaches significant benefits to citi-
zenship itself. One may dispute (and many have) the validity of the clear 
  
fair can only be undertaken after identifying first a pool of taxpayers and then the pool of resources 
available to them.”). 
 153. See generally Christians, supra note 13; sources cited supra note 65. 
 154. Since its inception in 1913, the modern income tax has always sought to tax individuals 
living in and who have substantial connections to the United States. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 
16, sec. II, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913) (“A. Subdivision 1. That there shall be levied, assessed, collect-
ed and paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding 
calendar year to every citizen of the United States, whether residing at home or abroad, and to every 
person residing in the United States, though not a citizen thereof, a tax of 1 per centum per annum 
upon such income . . . .”).  
 155. 265 U.S. 47 (1924). 
 156. Id. at 56 (“The contention was rejected that a citizen’s property without the limits of the 
United States derives no benefit from the United States. The contention, it was said, came from the 
confusion of thought in ‘mistaking the scope and extent of the sovereign power of the United States 
as a nation and its relations to its citizens and their relation to it. And that power in its scope and 
extent, it was decided, is based on the presumption that government by its very nature benefits the 
citizen and his property wherever found, and that opposition to it holds on to citizenship while it 
belittles and destroys its advantages and blessings by denying the possession by government of an 
essential power required to make citizenship completely beneficial.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 157. Id. 
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benefits and burdens relationship the Court so readily found, but the case 
endures as a statement of the relevance of the concept.158 
Benefit theory remains important in international tax law and poli-
cy. Intuitively appealing, the theory suggests that the benefits an individ-
ual receives from her government—infrastructure, education, healthcare, 
to name a few—justify taxation. Numerous scholars challenge the utility 
of benefit theory, particularly in setting the proper rate(s) for the individ-
ual income tax,159 and ability to pay is now the favored principle for sup-
porting progressive taxation.160 Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that 
benefits provided to individuals—whether citizens or residents—at least 
partially justify pulling individuals into the taxable community to be 
taxed on benefits received.161 Thus, though benefit theory does little to 
help set a rate of tax, it should and does impact the assessment of whom 
to tax. Accordingly, the theory has been an integral part of international 
tax policy discussions and remains relevant in discussions of citizenship 
taxation.162 
The rough benefit/burden aspect of benefit theory does more work 
in the context of the tax-immigration nexus, however. Arguably, it un-
derlies why Justice Thomas’s majority opinion in Kawashima may mis-
take the relevance of tax crimes to immigration law. Armed with the 
more nuanced concept of citizenship developed by social theory, we can 
recognize that laws governing citizenship participate in the process of 
“making” citizens.163 Laws that define the requirements for citizenship 
police the boundaries of membership in a given community—an act that 
may reflect the values of that community (law as culture) or may, more 
  
 158. See AVI-YONAH ET AL., supra note 9, at 21–22. 
 159. Id. at 19–20; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The International Tax Regime: A Centennial 
Reconsideration (Univ. Mich. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 462, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2622883 (discussing the shifting relevance of 
benefit theory for determining the taxation of individuals and contrasting that with its relevance for 
corporations). See generally LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES 
AND JUSTICE 18 (2002) (“[Th]e benefit principle gives us no guidance on what the tax rate or rates 
should be . . . .”). 
 160. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 159; see also MEHROTRA, supra note 72, at 10 
(discussing how advocates of a progressive tax system “played a pivotal role in supplanting the 
prevailing ‘benefits theory’ of taxation”). 
 161. See AVI-YONAH ET AL., supra note 9, at 20 (“In most of the modern literature the ‘ability 
to pay’ theory is preferred. In the international context, however, the ‘ability to pay’ is meaningless 
until one has identified the persons or the enterprises whose wealth is to be taken into ac-
count . . . . As a generalizing principle to deal with questions of selecting from among a world full of 
potential taxpayers those who will be taxed by a particular nation, the ‘cost-benefit’ analysis remains 
valuable.”). Administrability of policing compliance is another consideration. 
 162. Id.; Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 13, at 478 (“More funda-
mentally, as discussed above, a benefits analysis generally does not dictate the proper level of in-
come-based taxation. Rather, it merely determines whether sufficient grounds exist for exercising 
some kind of tax jurisdiction.”); Mason, supra note 13, at 173 (stating that benefits theory “carries 
some weight” in justifying keeping nonresident U.S. citizens in the taxable community); cf. Chris-
tians, supra note 13, at 9 (stating that benefit theory has not provided a normative principle for 
source jurisdiction). 
 163. For an introduction to this discussion, see THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CITIZENSHIP: A 
READER 10 (Sian Lazar ed., 2013); sources cited supra notes 12–16; discussion supra Part II. 
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aspirationally, attempt to discipline individuals to be more ideal versions 
of themselves (law as domination/discipline).164 A statement that borders 
on truism is that paying taxes is part of the fundamental bargain individ-
uals make with their government. In exchange for the benefits of citizen-
ship, the individual takes on the responsibility of paying taxes.165 There 
is, then, something special about tax. Moreover, the purchase that this 
idea has in popular rhetoric, case law, and the presence of the tax-
immigration nexus itself suggests that we, as tax scholars, must continue 
to wrestle with its implications, despite its weaknesses. 
A district court in Hawaii captured the special relevance of tax 
compliance to citizenship as it considered whether debt to a private party 
barred naturalization. In evaluating the petitioner’s denial of naturaliza-
tion for a lack of finding of good moral character, the court noted that the 
petitioner had “paid his taxes dutifully.”166 As it granted the naturaliza-
tion petition, the Court reasoned: 
Taxes and traffic fines are obligations owed to the government. They 
fund public expenditures that help all residents. The civil judgment 
here was owed to a private party. Even ignoring the apathy of this 
judgment creditor and Plaintiff's contentions about the wrongfulness 
of the judgment in the first place, failure to satisfy a debt to a private 
party is less of an “evil” against the good order of the United States 
than failure to pay taxes or traffic fines.167 
Tax offenses are relevant to immigration not only because they are 
illegal or because they involve fraud or deceit, but because they represent 
a breach of the basic benefit/burden agreement between the State and its 
citizens; because noncompliance with tax harms the “good order” of the 
sovereign and all its citizens. To be sure, this benefit/burden bargain may 
not be in the mind of every immigration official applying the immigra-
tion laws or every Congressman or woman as he or she drafted or voted 
on the passage of relevant provisions of the INA. Rarely are cultural 
concepts so neatly uniform. But the commonplace nature of the assertion 
that we pay taxes because of the benefits we receive from the govern-
ment, and the enforcement of that idea found in immigration law’s con-
tributions to the tax-immigration nexus, support the idea that tax does 
play an important and unique role in “making” citizens—a role that it 
should acknowledge and account for in its own law and policy. 
  
 164. THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF CITIZENSHIP, supra note 163, at 12–16 (summarizing a range of 
important anthropological work on the subject). 
 165. See Abulkhair v. Bush, No. 08-CV-5410 (DMC)(MF), 2010 WL 2521760, at *9 (D.N.J. 
June 14, 2010), aff’d, 413 F. App’x 502 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2011). Across disciplines, this idea is ever-
present. 
 166. Puciaty v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1039 (D. Haw. 2000). 
 167. Id. at 1041. 
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Recent legislation provides further evidence of the depth of pur-
chase of the benefit/burden argument and tax compliance. The recently 
enacted FAST Act created § 7345, a section that authorizes the revoca-
tion of an individual’s passport for “seriously delinquent tax debt.”168 
Among other requirements, the debt must be at least $50,000.169 The 
efficacy of the provision, which was signed into law in December 2015, 
is yet to be seen.170 The desire to keep those with tax debts in country 
likely stems, at least in part, from a desire to keep tabs on the person and 
his assets. It also, however, seems to fit within a trend, discussed at 
length in Professor Joshua Blank’s excellent Collateral Compliance, to 
more expressly tie tax compliance (the burden) to the conveyance of 
government benefits (herein, the passport).171 
Though Cook addressed the taxation of a nonresident citizen, the 
principle upon which it relied—that benefits provided justify taxation 
and keep a person in the taxable community—applies to taxation of resi-
dent noncitizens as well. In name, we tax resident noncitizens upon the 
basis of their presence as residents (residence-based taxation). Taxation 
upon residency is a widely accepted principle and I do not dispute the 
validity of that principle.172 What I do problematize, however, is how we 
should understand the substance of connections for which we use resi-
dence as a proxy.173 Existing scholarship accepts residence as such, or 
views citizenship as a proxy for residence or domicile. In the language of 
social theory, residence in tax is commonly viewed as an example of law 
as dispute resolution. More than one sovereign may lay claim to the in-
come of individual—the country “where income is produced (the source 
  
 168. I.R.S. § 7345(b) (2012).  
 169. Id. 
 170. Family law uses a similar tactic to attempt to enforce child support. 22 C.F.R. § 51.60 
(2012) (“The applicant has been certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services as notified 
by a state agency under 42 U.S.C. 652(k) to be in arrears of child support in an amount determined 
by statute.”). The tactic is generally held to be unsuccessful. See Drew A. Swank, The National 
Child Non-Support Epidemic, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 357, 367 (2003) (“Others, such as pass-
port denials or revocations, result in payment of child support so infrequently that it is nearly impos-
sible to do a quantitative analysis.”). 
 171. Joshua D. Blank, Collateral Compliance, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 740–42 (2014) (analyz-
ing when tax compliance may benefit from non-tax (collateral) sanctions for specific behavior and 
discussing whether revocation of a driver’s license for tax noncompliance may support tax compli-
ance). 
 172. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 1291 (“[O]ther nations tax individuals on their global income 
and holdings only if such individuals reside in these nations.”). 
 173. I am not the first to challenge the concept of residence. Allison Christians succinctly 
states: “[R]esidence is a thin concept that can be defined by almost any metric.” Christians, supra 
note 13, at 7. Christians highlights the failings of past and current attempts to articulate a principled 
concept of the appropriate bounds of “taxpayer.” As part of that project she challenges the concept 
of residence and the impacts of that weakness on tax justice. This issue is also explored in Allison 
Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (2013) (“One of the 
enduring problems for those who study international taxation from a normative perspective is that 
states have constantly and consistently failed to assert a comprehensively justifiable definition for 
the taxing jurisdiction.”). If residence is essentially a proxy for domicile, as Edward Zelinsky per-
suasively claims, and citizenship is a more administrable proxy for the same, query how substantive-
ly distinct are these three concepts. 
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jurisdiction)” or the country in which the income is “consumed or saved 
(the residence jurisdiction).”174 Defining residence and source are, then, 
means of determining when a nation should yield its taxing jurisdiction. 
Or, in more general terms, source and residence are mechanisms of con-
flict resolution.175 
Considering residency within the context of the tax-immigration 
nexus leads to the following conclusion: residence, particularly in the 
case of LPRs, should also be understood as a proxy for performative 
citizenship.176 In the terms of social theory, residence is an example of 
law as culture and law as discipline/domination. A legal expression of 
the belief that those who fall within the resident definition are, in sub-
stance citizens, if not legally so. And, that as performative citizens, they 
must fully perform their citizenship by complying with the tax law. Ar-
guing that residency is a proxy for performative citizenship does not di-
minish the role that the residency definition serves in determining the 
proper taxing jurisdiction. Legal rules can serve more than one purpose. 
But, by embracing a more nuanced understanding of the substance of the 
residency rules, we are better poised to evaluate the fundamental fairness 
of our tax regime as applied to those individuals who we pull into the 
taxable community. To support this proposition, let us return to the sub-
stantial presence definition. 
The substantial presence test177 is what renders authorized and unau-
thorized immigrants tax citizens, pulling them into the taxable communi-
ty. The test is the product of an attempt to clarify an area of law that had 
  
 174. Avi-Yonah, supra note 69, at 1305–06. 
 175. Much of the theory of residence and source developed with a focus on business income. 
For an excellent history of international taxation and the concepts of residence and source, see 
GRAETZ, supra note 69. 
 176. Edward Zelinsky argues that the United States is not out of step with the rest of the world 
because other nations’ concepts of residency target an individual’s domicile. Citizenship, in Zel-
insky’s view, is essentially just “an administrable, if sometimes overly broad, proxy 
for . . . domicile.” Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 1291.  
The United States’ worldwide taxation of its citizens is less different from international, 
residence-based norms than is widely believed. . . . Because citizenship and domicile re-
semble each other, and because other nations define residence for tax purposes as domi-
cile, the U.S. system of citizenship-based taxation typically reaches the same results as 
the residence-based systems of these other nations, but reaches these results more effi-
ciently by avoiding factually complex inquiries about domicile. 
Id. at 1289. 
 177. Though short-lived, the Code has been in the business of explicitly defining citizenship. In 
a 2006 article, Michael Kirsch details the enactment of two Code provisions that severed the Code’s 
definition of formal citizenship from that of immigration and nationality law: 
New Internal Revenue Code section 877(g), also enacted by the AJCA, creates a second 
tax code departure from the nationality law definition of citizenship. Whereas section 
7701(n) focuses on the timing of citizenship loss, section 877(g) addresses the period fol-
lowing citizenship loss. Pursuant to section 877(g), certain individuals who lose citizen-
ship under the nationality law and have that loss recognized for tax purposes under sec-
tion 7701(n) may, nonetheless, be treated as citizens for tax purposes in future years.  
Michael S. Kirsch, The Tax Code as Nationality Law, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375, 386 (2006). 
 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:2 236 
been highly fact-intensive and led to inconsistent outcomes.178 Substan-
tial presence thus arose as an objective proxy for a subjective inquiry. 
Prior to the adoption of the test, courts looked to a range of factors to 
determine whether an individual was a resident: whether the individual 
had benefitted economically from being in the United States,179 whether 
the individual had an intent to remain in a given country,180 and where an 
individual owned a home or where her family lived.181 Pre and post-
adoption of the substantial presence test, the law labels the metric for an 
individual’s investment, both social and economic, in the country in 
which she lived as residence. But substance sometimes differs from la-
bels. Though courts struggled with distinguishing residence from domi-
cile, or defining the scope of relevant facts and circumstances to consid-
er, the key question they were trying to assess was: are you invested and 
integrated in the national community enough to justify taxation? Put in 
the language of a social theory of citizenship: are you acting like a citi-
zen such that you should bear one of citizenship’s burdens (or privileg-
es), namely, paying taxes? 
The closer-connection exception to the substantial presence test 
gives more insight to the factors Congress deems relevant to determine 
whether an individual is a tax citizen. Part IV of Form 8840—the form 
an individual must file to attempt to avoid resident status under the sub-
stantial presence test—asks a number of questions regarding the individ-
ual’s ties to a foreign country. Those questions include social and eco-
nomic connections: Where was your family located in the relevant 
  
 178. Preece v. Comm’r, 95 T.C. 594, 602 (1990) (“Section 7701(b)(3)(A) was intended to 
replace the more complex facts and circumstances test of section 1.871-2, Income Tax Regs., for 
purposes of determining whether an alien was a resident of the United States. H. Rept. No. 98-432, 
vol. 1 at 222 (1983).”). For further discussion of the history of the test and a proposal for a humani-
tarian exemption when individuals flee violence in their home countries, see generally Hoose, supra 
note 13. 
 179. Comm’r v. Nubar, 185 F.2d 584, 586 (4th Cir. 1950) (“Upon these facts, we think that the 
conclusion of the Tax Court that taxpayer was an alien non-resident and was not engaged in business 
in the United States was clearly erroneous, whether regarded as a conclusion of fact or as a conclu-
sion of law. We find nothing in the law or in the facts to justify the exemption of this alien, who had 
lived in our country during the war years because of the difficulties and dangers of departure, and 
who had availed himself of his presence here to make a fortune by trading on our exchanges, from 
taxes required of others by the country who protection he had enjoyed and whose economic organi-
zation he had utilized for his profit. On the contrary, we think it clear that he was not a non-resident 
alien within the meaning of the statutory exemption and that he was engaged in business within the 
United States so as to take him without the exemption even if he were properly considered a non-
resident alien.” (footnote omitted)). The Fourth Circuit does make a distinction between residence 
and domicile, finding residence to be the more impermanent of the two concepts. See id. at 587. 
Such a view runs counter to my argument that residence is a proxy for performative citizenship. 
However, the court itself says the distinction between the two is hard to discern. See id. (“The word 
‘resident’ (and its antonym ‘nonresident’) are very slippery words, which have many and varied 
meanings.”). Importantly, the tie breakers for resident alien status seen in treaties, case law, and the 
closer connection exception track traditional markers of performative citizenship. As such and in 
light of the tax-immigration nexus, I resolve the ambiguity by understanding residence as a proxy for 
citizenship rather than a less permanent connection. 
 180. Seeley v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 175, 180 (1950), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 186 F.2d 541 (2d 
Cir. 1951). 
 181. White v. Comm’r, 22 T.C. 585, 592–93 (1954). 
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year(s)? Where were your belongings? Where were you registered to 
vote? Where were your bank accounts? Where did you earn the majority 
of your income? Where, if applicable, were you entitled to the benefit of 
national health care?182 These questions, taken together, attempt to iden-
tify the community in which an individual is substantially invested per a 
comprehensive concept of citizenship. The one in which she lives her 
life, conducts business, exercises civil rights, and where she has deep and 
significant social ties. These types of connections, taken together, consti-
tute the multiple aspects of a social theory of citizenship. 
Of course an individual may have deep economic and social ties to 
a nation of which she is not a citizen.183 In that case, then, perhaps resi-
dence is just residence—a sufficient tie to subject an individual to tax or 
to solve the problem of determining the appropriate taxing authority, but 
not a proxy for an individual being a citizen in all but name. But to come 
to this conclusion would mean adopting a narrow, legalistic, status-based 
definition of citizenship—the very definition of citizenship social theory 
suggests is incomplete at best. 
When we understand citizenship as a mix of legal status, rights, ob-
ligations, and belonging, then where we see attempts to identify these 
ties, we find an effort to identify citizenship. Unsurprisingly, the legal 
status looms large in tax as it provides the statutory basis for citizenship-
based taxation (CBT). But we do not confine CBT to formal citizens 
alone. Instead, tax looks to markers of the other connections and actions 
through which we identify citizenship and through which individuals 
perform their citizenship. Though it labels LPRs and those who are sub-
stantially present as resident aliens, the substance of the connections 
§ 7701 defines as residence, in fact track and codify a concept of per-
formative citizenship. Thus, we assert a right to tax because individuals 
are living and acting like citizens. In brief, the concept of tax citizenship 
inherent in the resident alien status and its codification of performative 
citizenship flags LPRs as essentially indistinguishable from formal citi-
zens and taxes them accordingly. 
The robust tax-immigration nexus supports reconceptualizing resi-
dence as performative citizenship. The nexus makes very clear that tax 
compliance is a critical aspect of defining who is worthy of citizenship 
  
 182. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep’t of the Treasury, Form 8840: Closer Connection Exception 
Statement for Aliens (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8840.pdf. 
 183. An individual may have deep connections to multiple nations and depending upon the 
citizenship laws of those countries may simultaneously be a citizen of such countries. The fact that 
an individual has citizenship, whether performative or legal, in multiple jurisdictions does not defeat 
the argument that the United States’ definition of residence relied upon a concept of performative 
citizenship. Rather, it simply implies the need for tiebreaker or apportionment rules. See, e.g., 
MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL ch. 2, art. 4.2 (ORG. 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 2003), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/2014-model-tax-convention-
articles.pdf (describing examples of tiebreaker rules and procedural requirements); Internal Revenue 
Serv., supra note 182. 
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and what it means to be a citizen. In the language of anthropology, the 
tax citizen category—by treating noncitizen residents the same as formal 
citizens—serves two purposes. First, it draws immigrants into the full 
responsibilities of citizenship, respecting the understanding that tax citi-
zens lack only formal status but are substantively citizens in a performa-
tive way. Second, it supports the immigration law project of directing 
individuals into the behavior expected of citizens—herein, tax compli-
ance—where violation of that norm results in expulsion from the 
group.184 Both goals impact the fundamental fairness of the foundational 
question that runs throughout this Article: who should be subject to tax? 
The answer, suggested by the tax-immigration nexus, is that it is those 
individuals who are formally or substantively citizens. When tax law 
lacks a formal marker of citizenship, it turns then to the informal one of 
performative status found in the resident alien definition. 
Taking stock of the contributions of the tax-immigration we find the 
following: immigration law elevates tax compliance as a key factor in 
defining who is eligible for citizenship or even who may remain in the 
country. Further, tax law uses both a formal and informal definition of 
citizenship to achieve two ends: (1) to identify those who belong to the 
taxable community; and (2) to support the disciplinary project of immi-
gration law. The impact of these insights for tax law and policy is the 
subject of Part IV. 
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING CITIZENSHIP AND 
TAXATION 
Recognizing the existence and extent of the tax-immigration nexus 
provides an opportunity to reassess the fairness (or unfairness) of the 
current tax regime as applied to lawful permanent residents. Recall that 
the United States taxes formal citizens and tax citizens alike, at the same 
rates and by the same laws. Born or naturalized citizens are, in effect, 
considered essentially indistinguishable from tax citizens for tax purpos-
es. But full recognition of the tax-immigration nexus challenges the no-
tion that LPRs, who are only tax citizens but not formal citizens, are in-
distinguishable. This final Part explores the meaningful distinctions be-
tween tax and formal citizens for tax policy and suggests changes to re-
flect these differences. 
A. Benefit Theory, the Tax-Immigration Nexus, and the CBT Debate 
Recent scholarship on citizenship and tax overwhelmingly focuses 
on whether the U.S. system of worldwide taxation based upon citizenship 
is an appropriate principle for individual taxation.185 Scholars defending 
  
 184. See supra Parts II & III (discussing anthropology, law, and citizenship). 
 185. See supra note 13, for the principle articles on this topic. Notably, however, a few tax 
scholars have addressed other aspects of the citizenship and taxation discussion. See, e.g., Nancy C. 
Staudt, Taxation and Gendered Citizenship, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 533 (1997) (dis-
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CBT do so on the grounds that citizenship confers significant benefits, 
that it serves as an administrable proxy for residence or domicile, or that 
it indicates membership in the community of taxpayers to whom ability 
to pay principles should apply.186 Scholars who challenge worldwide 
taxation on the basis of citizenship find the benefits of citizenship to be 
inadequate, citizenship to be a poor proxy for community membership, 
or the regime to be inefficient and inadministrable in practice.187 And 
while scholars in both camps recognize the role of social theory in defin-
ing citizenship and the benefits and burdens of citizenship, they focus 
largely on a formal, legal definition of citizenship in tax.188 
Driving much of the recent tax scholarship and news coverage of 
CBT189 is a concern for the system’s impacts on nonresident U.S. citi-
zens. This focus is too narrow, and a shift to view nonresident citizens 
alongside LPRs illustrates the negative equity impacts of that narrow 
view. Both nonresident U.S. citizens and LPRs have a version of imper-
fect citizenship. Nonresident U.S. citizens possess formal citizenship but 
do not or cannot avail themselves of the full array of benefits that citi-
zenship affords and, though they may have deep ties to the United States, 
cannot perform their citizenship in the same way as a resident individual. 
Resident LPRs may benefit more extensively from government services 
and more easily perform their citizenship but lack the formal status of 
being a citizen. Both groups, then, have grounds to argue that the bur-
dens of their imperfect citizenship, whether formal or performative, out-
weigh the benefits. Despite this commonality, however, the impact of 
CBT on LPRs is largely unexplored. The focus of this part is to remedy 
that fact. 
Benefit theory, introduced in Part III, is one of the factors consid-
ered in current evaluations of citizenship-based taxation. The set of rele-
vant benefits for consideration in CBT (or other attempts to define simi-
  
cussing how tax law may shape women’s participation in public and private life and, thereby, influ-
ence their ability to achieve full citizenship). 
 186. See, e.g., Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 13; Zelinsky, supra 
note 13, at 1320–24. Scholars may combine or refine these grounds for citizenship-based taxation 
but the drivers of these grounds are the bigger principles of tax policy of fairness and administrabil-
ity. Supporters of citizenship-based taxation also discuss efficiency concerns regarding the incen-
tives created by departing from the current regime but the goals of fairness and administrability seem 
to dominate. See, e.g., Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 13. 
 187. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 680–85; Blum & Singer, supra note 13, at 705–11; 
Mason, supra note 13, at 189–224. 
 188. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 13, at 480–84 (describing the 
challenges of defining the taxable community); Mason, supra note 13, at 228 (noting the implica-
tions of noncompliance for immigration); id. at 189–211 (discussing more generally the balance of 
burdens and benefits of citizenship and challenges of delimiting community membership); Zelinsky, 
supra note 13, at 1303–12 (discussing different models of citizenship and their implications for the 
benefit theory assessment of citizenship-based taxation). 
 189. In addition to scholars writing on the topic, there are a number of vocal advocacy groups 
for U.S. citizens who live abroad, most notably, American Citizens Abroad. To learn more of their 
views on CBT and other issues affecting nonresident U.S. citizens, see AM. CITIZENS ABROAD, 
https://www.americansabroad.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2017). 
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larly situated individuals) is subject to debate, as is valuation of those 
benefits. Nevertheless, if we accept that benefit theory is relevant in de-
fining the taxable community—as case law, scholarship, and the tax-
immigration nexus suggest we must, at least in part—we have to attempt 
the project. One goal of tax policy is to achieve horizontal equity—
meaning taxing similarly situated individuals the same.190 Knowing the 
benefits available to and utilized by individuals helps us define similarly 
situated individuals. Though determining who is similarly situated to 
whom is an immensely challenging task, it is one we continue to wrestle 
with as we evaluate one of three core considerations of tax policy: fair-
ness or equity.191 The tax-immigration nexus contributes to this difficult 
work. 
Current scholarship takes stock of the benefits of citizenship and 
leans toward the view that the burdens of CBT outweigh the benefits for 
U.S. citizens abroad. But considering the taxation of LPRs informs this 
discussion by identifying the value of a heretofore unexplored benefit 
LPRs lack: permanence of status. Compare an LPR living in Montana to 
a U.S. citizen living in Paris. We may be inclined to say that the LPR 
receives more benefits from the United States that justify taxing her than 
does the U.S. citizen abroad—the LPR utilizes U.S. infrastructure, may 
send her children to public school, and enjoys the protection of U.S. 
laws, to name a few.192 But U.S. citizens, whether resident or not, wheth-
er performing their citizenship or not, have a permanent status, should 
they choose to retain it. As mere tax citizens, LPRs lack that same per-
manence of status accorded formal citizens, though they may have 
stronger purchase on community membership because of their performa-
tive citizenship. Permanence of status193 is thus a key distinction between 
resident tax citizens and U.S. citizens, and the inherent insecurity of sta-
  
 190. Like many policy concepts, horizontal equity has been the subject of criticism. See, e.g., 
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 159, at 37–39. It persists, however, as one of many tools used to 
assess the fairness of a given provision or tax regime. Id. at 37. 
 191. Tax systems are regularly evaluated by how well they satisfy three key concepts: equi-
ty/fairness, efficiency/neutrality, and administrability (simplicity/complexity). 
 192. See, e.g., Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 188, at 478 (“While 
citizens abroad do not enjoy some of the benefits available to citizens within the United States, U.S. 
citizens at home do not enjoy some of the benefits provided to citizens abroad such as the personal 
and property protection discussed above.”); Mason, supra note 13, at 193–94 (stating that even if 
there are residual benefits of citizenship for nonresident U.S. citizens, those benefits cannot justify 
taxation to the same extent as resident U.S citizens). 
 193. The right to re-enter is often cited as one of few or two benefits (voting being the second) 
a nonresident U.S. citizen enjoys. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 188, at 
478. Permanence of status should be distinguished from the right to re-enter the United States, a 
benefit discussed by both opponents and supporters of citizenship-based taxation in evaluating 
whether the benefits of U.S. citizenship support the current regime. Permanence of status is broader 
than right to re-enter as it encompasses the right to remain in the United States regardless of non-
compliance with the tax laws as well as the right to re-enter. 
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tus that tax citizens face, made even greater post-Kawashima, should be 
treated as a relevant difference for tax benefit/burden assessments.194 
Permanence of status and the ability to re-enter the country are dif-
ferent aspects of a core benefit: security. Formal citizenship grants secu-
rity—the right both to re-enter the nation of one’s citizenship and the 
right to remain there. An LPR may be secure in her nation of citizenship 
but lacks that same security in the nation to which she immigrates. Writ-
ing on the role emigrants play in constructing citizenship, Kim Barry 
eloquently captures the value of this security and, by extension, the ef-
fects of insecurity: “The import of that security for emigrants (and its 
concomitant insecurity for even those emigrants who are long-term non-
citizen residents of immigration states) should not be underestimated. 
Only where residence is legally secure can individuals ‘plan their lives 
accordingly.’”195 In other words, security of permanent status, not simply 
the right to re-enter, is a meaningful benefit of citizenship that emerges 
in the comparison of LPRs and U.S. citizens in light of the tax-
immigration nexus. 
Now consider the following comparisons and distinctions: resident 
citizens and legally present noncitizens have essentially equal access to 
many benefits and are taxed similarly,196 an outcome benefit theory and 
ability to pay can support. Yet if we understand the security of perma-
nent status as a benefit, a distinction emerges between resident citizens 
and noncitizens—one that may justify differing tax treatment. Both 
groups perform their citizenship but performative citizenship results in 
tax citizenship, not formal citizenship. Nonresident citizens, the popula-
tion of concern in the current literature, may avail themselves of fewer 
benefits than do resident noncitizens, perhaps justifying a lower tax bur-
den.197 But does that assessment change when we add into the mix the 
security of permanent status denied LPRs? Perhaps. The difficulty of 
using benefit theory to assess horizontal equity makes it an imperfect 
  
 194. Cf. Peter J. Spiro, The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of Citizenship, 21 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 899, 900 (2013). Spiro sees the distinction between citizens and noncitizens as 
largely formal, stating “the leakiness of immigration enforcement mitigates the consequence of this 
important formal differential [the fact that citizens enjoy absolute locational security].” Id.; see also 
Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 166 (“The challenges faced by undocumented migrants highlight 
the continued salience of the state, which through granting or withholding residency and citizenship 
status profoundly affects immigrants’ life chances.”). 
 195. Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11, 25 (2006). 
 196. For a full discussion of immigrant access to federal benefits such as TANF or SNAP, see 
RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34500, UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS’ ACCESS TO 
FEDERAL BENEFITS: POLICY AND ISSUES 1–21 (2012). 
 197. Mason alludes to this idea, stating that that CBT advocates “argue that because nonresi-
dents receive benefits from the Unites States, they should pay U.S. tax. Although this argument 
carries some weight, it cannot justify taxing nonresident Americans similarly to resident Americans 
who receive far more benefits.” Mason, supra note 13, at 173. Based upon her arguments advanced 
in the rest of the paper and our discussions, however, I doubt Professor Mason would see this as an 
acceptable response to CBT. 
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tool. Nevertheless, as it remains part of the international tax discussion, 
permanence of status should be considered a distinguishing benefit be-
tween U.S. citizens and LPRs. 
Introducing permanence of status to the CBT morass—an out-
growth of the tax-immigration nexus—gives rise to at least two potential 
responses. First, those who argue against CBT might use the unfairness 
of the regime as applied to LPRs to bolster their argument against the 
status quo, as an additional weight on the scale that justifies overhaul of 
an unfair and inefficient regime. Second, pro-CBT scholars might use the 
same insight to argue, as I did above, that nonresident U.S. citizens are 
not so unfairly burdened as it may seem; that keeping citizens abroad 
within the taxable community is on par with subjecting LPRs to the same 
tax laws as citizens, despite their fundamental insecurity. Stated differ-
ently, both have weaknesses in the citizenship burden/benefit bundle but 
the current regime properly accounts for those weaknesses. This Article 
does not delve into a full-fledged analysis of CBT and, as such, I do not 
take a hard stance on CBT but rather suggest that the discussion requires 
analyzing the tax-immigration nexus and its implications. 
B. Inequities of the Tax-Immigration Nexus: A Way Forward 
Tax law in itself cannot and should not determine the proper rela-
tionship between tax, immigration, and citizenship. Allowing individuals 
to live in the United States, whether temporarily or permanently, creates 
a ripple effect of collateral consequences, as each individual may be un-
derstood as a package deal of burdens and benefits. Each individual plac-
es his own demands upon the government, infrastructure, and public 
goods while making his own contributions. Immigration law, fiscal poli-
cy, political theory, anthropology, and sociology are clear contributors to 
the discussion of the relationship between tax, immigration, and citizen-
ship.198 A state must balance its desire to attract immigrants for economic 
and/or humanitarian reasons with the implications of the responsibilities 
that state bears to its residents and citizens. Revenue, and by extension, 
tax law and policy, are only part of that calculus. 
Revenue is not the only goal tax law considers, however. Accepting 
that revenue is the primary goal of any tax system, U.S. tax law must 
also be cognizant of its intersection with immigration law and the equity 
concerns created therein. The tax-immigration nexus helps conceptualize 
a new benefit of formal citizenship: permanence of status. But the contri-
bution of the tax-immigration nexus goes beyond benefit theory assess-
ments, to push us to see the positive role tax law plays in defining citi-
  
 198. See Bloemraad et al., supra note 55, at 170 (“Finally, the study of citizenship and immi-
gration cannot be viewed as uniquely the domain of immigration scholars. Rather, the intersection of 
citizenship and immigration raises broad issues of inequality, state power, and social cohesion.”). 
Accordingly, to the extent immigration law scholars view the tax-immigration nexus as too punitive, 
such scholars and policymakers could propose reforms from within immigration law. 
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zenship and making citizens. Specifically, the tax-immigration nexus 
suggests that treating LPRs fairly may require reforming existing tax 
law. 
1. Considering an Immigration Law Solution 
Before addressing the implications of the tax-immigration nexus for 
tax law and suggesting some avenues for reform or future research, it is 
prudent to pause and address a potential objection: can the inequities of 
the tax-immigration nexus be solved by immigration law? If one agrees 
that collateral immigration consequences lack proportionality with the 
tax offense(s) committed, should or could immigration law remedy the 
problem by deciding tax offenses are immaterial to deportation or natu-
ralization considerations? Bypassing the debate of the unlikelihood of 
such reform, the answer is no. First, removing immigration law’s contri-
butions to the tax-immigration nexus would be an overreaction to the 
current inequities. There is value in immigration law emphasizing the 
importance of tax compliance to aspiring citizens—doing so serves an 
important expressive (law as culture) and training (law as discipline) 
function. In short, the tax-immigration nexus plays an important role in 
immigration law that should not be abandoned without careful considera-
tion. 
A different iteration of the objection may then arise, however, tak-
ing the view that a lack of proportionality in punishment created by im-
migration law is not a tax concern. This is also error. Disproportional 
sanctions for tax offenses can undermine the perceived fairness of the 
system, which can, in turn, have negative implications for tax compli-
ance, even when those sanctions arise outside of the tax system.199 The 
fact that it is immigration and not tax that punishes an individual differ-
ently for the same tax offense should not preclude considering a lack of 
proportionality for tax policy purposes. Indeed, tax policy scholars and 
advocates frequently consider the interaction of exogenous factors with 
substantive tax law.200 Further, the fact that tax plays such an important 
  
 199. Blank, supra note 171, at 778. 
 200. Examples of scholarship in this vein include discussions of the single-earner bias that note 
that the bias takes on a more problematic gender aspect in light of the social patterns of household 
work. Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2002–67 (discussing the single-earner bias and efficacy of common proposals 
to remedy gender discrimination in the Code). Edward McCaffery provides an excellent discussion 
of this bias in his article, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Biases in the Code. 
Noting the gendered impact of the bias, McCaffery writes: 
There is no priori reason to assume the wife should be the marginal earner . . . But the 
current tax structure tends to push toward a “primary-secondary” delineation among 
working spouses, marginalizing the lesser-earning person. Here, as elsewhere, it is crucial 
to consider social context in evaluating the tax laws–it is by failing to do so that ostensi-
bly “neutral” ideology entrenches discriminatory patterns. . . . Historically, of course, 
wives have usually been the marginal earners. . . . The general lesson of the story is that 
married women are at the margins of the workforce—in terms of wages, power, and 
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role in policing citizenship and structuring its requirements supports the 
relevance of the nexus for tax policy purposes. The legitimacy of a tax 
system depends, in part, upon the legitimacy of the means it uses to de-
fine the taxable community. That community is defined both by tax and 
immigration law, and tax must acknowledge that fact. 
Third, removing all collateral immigration consequences for tax of-
fenses would not solve the problem that looms large for tax policy: that 
LPRs and U.S. citizens are distinguishable though they are treated as 
indistinguishable by current tax law. Even if tax offenses could not lead 
to removal or denial of citizenship, the insecurity of LPRs as compared 
to U.S. citizens would remain. The tax-immigration nexus allowed iden-
tification of this important distinction between LPRs and U.S. citizens, 
but dissolving the nexus would not dissolve that distinction. Further, tax 
policy may be able to benefit from a more finely-tuned tax-immigration 
nexus, as will be explored later in this part. 
In the following subparts, I introduce three potential reforms, modi-
fied reporting requirements for LPRs, a credit, and a rate change, as well 
as identify areas for future research, both theoretical and empirical. The 
goal of these subparts is not to unequivocally endorse one or more spe-
cific reforms. Instead, I offer frameworks for reforms that respect and 
further develop the value of the tax-immigration nexus to both immigra-
tion and tax law, while reigning-in its inequitable effects. 
2. Reducing the Likelihood of Tax “Footfalls” 
The first proposal is, in some ways, the most modest.  While, as 
subsequent discussion will show, a credit may be too limited in scope to 
achieve true equity for LPRs, a rate schedule change may swing too far 
in the opposite direction, granting too extensive relief in light of the simi-
larities between LPRs and resident formal citizens. Even if we were in-
terested in pursuing a different rate schedule for LPRs, the difficulty of 
valuing benefits, and, by extension, using benefit theory to set a rate, 
could make such reform unattainable. Another option presents itself, 
however, in the form of modified filing requirements as a middle ground 
solution between a credit and a rate schedule change. 
Section III.B introduced the role tax law plays in the good moral 
character assessment for naturalization. The tax-immigration nexus runs 
a significant risk of an outcome—denial of naturalization—that is dis-
proportionate to the offense—an alleged or established civil tax of-
fense—at this point of connection. Accordingly, tweaking the nexus at 
this point would do much to remedy its inequities. Scholarship that ar-
  
costs—and the tax laws contribute to this marginalization by putting the wife’s income at 
the margins of the family’s. 
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the 
Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 993–94 (1993). 
2017] THE TAX-IMMIGRATION NEXUS  245 
gues against CBT provides a potential direction for such a reform: For-
eign Accounts Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and Foreign Bank Ac-
count Report (FBAR) filing requirements. 
A great deal of contemporary arguments against CBT draw upon 
the complexity of complying with FATCA and FBAR as support for 
abolishing CBT. Both FATCA and FBAR ostensibly target tax evaders 
by requiring individuals and, in some instances, third parties, to disclose 
information regarding foreign accounts and assets.201 The general thrust 
of the criticism holds that the complexity of the regimes leads to inad-
vertent noncompliance and generates too significant a burden for well-
meaning taxpayers.202 An oft-cited standard for the required good moral 
character assessment in immigration is the conduct of the average citi-
zen.203 If there are widely held and legitimate concerns of whether U.S. 
citizens can comply, LPRs should receive the same concern. One may 
reasonably assume that LPRs, like the nonresident U.S. citizens who are 
commonly the focus of this literature, are likely to have properties or 
accounts in their country of citizenship. They are, then, likely to have to 
interact with this complex and deeply criticized regime. Acknowledging 
the tax-immigration nexus provides further support for arguments against 
FATCA and FBAR regimes. Short of overhaul, however, tax law can 
respond by creating a grace period of reduced reporting requirements for 
LPRs. Such a reform would address the insecurity of LPRs as compared 
to U.S. citizens, while respecting the overarching compliance goals that 
FATCA and FBAR aim to support. 
Congress could enact provisions modifying the FATCA and FBAR 
rules as applied to LPRs.204 LPRs could, for example, be exempt from 
reporting otherwise reportable foreign accounts or interests for five 
years, the same period discussed in the following rate schedule proposal. 
  
 201. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS FBAR REFERENCE GUIDE, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/irsfbarreferenceguide.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2017); Allison Chris-
tians, Paperwork and Punishment: It’s Time to Fix the FBAR, TAX NOTES INT’L, Oct. 2014, at 147, 
147. To access the FBAR form, see File the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) 
as an Individual, BSA E-FILING SYSTEM, 
http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/NoRegFilePDFIndividualFBAR.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2017). To 
access FATCA Form 8938, see Internal Revenue Serv., Dep’t of the Treasury, Form 8938: State-
ment of Specified Foreign Financial Assets (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8938.pdf. 
FATCA also imposes third-party reporting requirements. Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason, Exporting 
FATCA, 142 TAX NOTES 1245, 1246 (2014). 
 202. See, e.g., Christians, supra note 201, at 147–48; Mason, supra note 13, at 213–15; Allison 
Christians, Assoc. Professor, H. Heward Stikeman Chair in Tax Law, McGill Univ., Address at the 
International Conference on Taxpayer Rights: Understanding the Accidental American: Tina’s 
Story, (Nov. 18, 2015) (transcript), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/understanding-accidental-
american-tinas-story. 
 203. Hussein v. Barrett, 820 F.3d 1083, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing 8 C.F.R. 
§ 316.10(a)(2) and noting that “[t]he regulation instructs the USCIS to evaluate claims of good moral 
character on a case-by-case basis taking into account the enumerated elements in the section as well 
as the standards of the average citizen in the community of residence”); see supra note 122 and 
accompanying text. 
 204. 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2012); I.R.C. § 6038D (2012). 
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The benefits of such a reform are twofold. First, foreign properties or 
interests have a more tenuous connection to the United States—their 
connection stemming from the presence of the taxpayer—than, for ex-
ample, the wages an LPR earns at her job in her U.S. hometown.205 A 
grace period of modified reporting is, then, a better-targeted reform than 
a rate reduction. A grace period would ensure the income with strong ties 
to the United States is taxed the same to LPRs and citizens on the same 
terms. Second, to the extent the complexity of FBAR and FATCA regu-
larly give rise to inadvertent noncompliance, modified reporting re-
quirements remove that point of nexus and potential inequity of the tax-
immigration nexus, albeit temporarily. Stated differently, a modified 
reporting regime would lessen the possibility of FBAR and FATCA non-
compliance being used to demonstrate lack of good moral character—a 
result that brings greater proportionality to the tax-immigration nexus by 
limiting the severe consequences of potentially excusable footfalls, with-
out sacrificing its expressive and disciplinary aspects. 
A modified reporting regime or similar reform need not be confined 
to FATCA and FBAR. Were other scholars, with different points of fo-
cus or expertise, to take up discussion of the tax-immigration nexus, oth-
er areas of potential footfalls might emerge which place LPRs at unnec-
essary risk of disproportionate consequences for their noncompliance. By 
remedying such concerns, tax law could find itself on stronger footing 
when it does assert the right to tax a given individual or item of income. 
3. Tax Credit for Naturalization Costs 
The path to citizenship is riddled with costs, many of them mone-
tary. A recent Pew Research Center report indicates that many LPRs cite 
the costs of naturalization as a roadblock to becoming a U.S. citizen.206 
Filing fees for the Form N-400 alone can be as high at $680.207 Any costs 
for counsel or other assistance to complete the naturalization process add 
to the total price tag of naturalization. The financial cost of naturalization 
is not a tax issue but tax law could provide relief. Specifically, Congress 
could craft a refundable or partially refundable tax credit for qualifying 
naturalization costs. Consider the following hypothetical: 
Ishita has been an LPR of the United States for twelve years. She 
averages taxable income of $35,000 a year. Ishita has one child who 
qualifies as a dependent so her taxable income puts her in the 15% tax 
  
 205. Exempting certain foreign accounts would not, of course, mean exempting money earned 
in the United States or derived from U.S. properties that was funneled into such accounts. Any 
modified reporting regime would have to take into account the creative force that is tax avoidance 
and evasion.  
 206. GONZALEZ-BARRERA ET AL., supra note 23, at 7, 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/02/04/the-path-not-taken/. 
 207. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., supra note 91; Additional Information on Filing a 
Fee Waiver, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/feewaiver (last updat-
ed June 2, 2016). 
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bracket.208 To put that cost in perspective, assuming Ishita is a single 
parent who uses daycare services, the $680 filing fee represents almost 
an entire month’s daycare costs.209 Childcare costs are only one example 
of the potential budget challenges an LPR might face when trying to find 
the money to complete the naturalization process. A credit could increase 
Ishita’s tax refund, perhaps freeing up the necessary funds to apply to 
become a citizen.210 Such a credit could be keyed an individual’s ability 
to pay, phasing out as an individual’s taxable income increases. 
The policy of subsidizing the costs of naturalization has support in 
current law. Indeed, UCSIS provides the possibility of a fee waiver for 
qualifying individuals.211 To receive a waiver an individual must meet 
one of three requirements: he or a qualifying individual in the individu-
al’s household receives means-tested governmental benefits, the individ-
ual’s household income is at or below 150% of the federal poverty level, 
or the individual is facing a qualifying financial hardship such as unex-
pected medical bills.212 A credit would further the policy of recognizing 
financial restraints by extending it to another population: those individu-
als whose income exceeds current fee waiver limits, but for whom fees 
still present a significant challenge. 
There are multiple benefits to a naturalization costs credit. First, 
such a credit would be a relatively minor change that would provide tar-
geted relief to some LPRs. As such, it would join a number of credits that 
take account of costs taxpayers incur that the government deems worthy 
of subsidy, such as child care costs or investments in energy-efficient 
appliances.213 It also represents a small nod to the fact that LPRs are 
meaningfully distinct from U.S. citizens and that the differences between 
  
 208. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. This hypothetical assumes Ishita files as a head 
of household. 
 209. CHILDCARE AWARE OF AM., PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE: 2014 
REPORT, 40–41 (2014), 
https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cyf/2014_Parents_and_the_High_Cost_of_Child_Care.pdf. My 
analysis uses one of the least expensive states on which the state reported. Id. In one of the most 
expensive states the fee represents about half of the average monthly cost. Id. 
 210. Of course there would be a mismatch between the time of payment of the filing fee and 
credit. Recent changes, however, permit LPRs to pay naturalization fees by credit card. Presumably, 
then, an individual would aim to pay the fees toward the end of the taxable year to reduce the 
amount of time between payment and refund. Though this is an imperfect solution to the problem of 
supporting the naturalization costs of LPRs, it is at least a step in the direction of increased support. 
 211. Additional Information on Filing a Fee Waiver, supra note 207. 
 212. Id. 
 213. I.R.C. § 24 provides a child tax credit while § 25D defines a credit for qualifying residen-
tial property. See I.R.C. § 24 (2012); I.R.C. § 25D (2012). The wisdom of such credits that make tax 
a social policy tool is hotly debated. Whether or not tax should be a tool of social policy is not, 
however, the focus of this Article. For examples of this discussion, see STANLEY S. SURREY, 
PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973); Edward D. Kleinbard, 
The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political 
Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (2010); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The 
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 975–76 (1986). 
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the two groups may justify a slightly lower effective tax rate (created by 
a limited credit).214 
Second, the presence of a credit for naturalization costs could have 
tax compliance benefits. Providing a targeted credit to low and lower 
income individuals would signal that the government supports the pursuit 
of citizenship by qualified individuals as it would show a willingness to 
subsidize that process where appropriate. The credit therein recasts the 
tax system from simple potential bludgeon to a partner in the path to 
citizenship. To the extent respect for the tax system and a perception of it 
as fundamentally fair have positive implications for tax compliance, such 
a credit could further incentivize compliance by the immigrant popula-
tion by engendering a positive view of the Code, rather than just fear of 
the immigration consequences of noncompliance.215 
Third and last, a credit has the benefit of being highly customiza-
ble.216 A naturalization costs credit could be limited to only the Form N-
400 filing fee or expanded to include the filing fee and some fees paid to 
a lawyer for assistance in the naturalization process. A credit could uti-
lize a gradual phaseout as an individual’s adjusted gross income increas-
es to better target the identified population of need.217 The possibilities 
  
 214. Some may challenge such a preference as unjustified or bad policy for its potential to 
encourage immigration. To the extent the reader does not consider immigration or naturalization to 
be a generally positive force, she may object to any subsidy in this area. However, to the extent we 
view immigration or naturalization of individuals already present in the United States to be a posi-
tive, subsidizing those costs to some degree could reap rewards.  
 215. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 171, at 769–71; Andrea Monroe, Integrity in Taxation: Re-
thinking Partnership Tax, 64 ALA. L. REV. 289, 293–94 (2012) (“Integrity seeks to create a cohesive 
and unified legal system that its members consider just and fair even when the pursuit of system-
wide coherence demands the sacrifice of some justice or fairness in individual instances. Integrity 
thus fosters a legal system’s legitimacy, cultivating loyalty to the system despite disagreements 
about particular laws. The principle of integrity is seldom applied in tax scholarship. Yet integrity 
has a natural appeal in thinking about the discordant values of partnership taxation, which have left 
the system complicated, fractured, and bereft of a unifying core. Integrity also highlights the im-
portance of legitimacy in subchapter K, where a system of voluntary compliance allows most part-
nerships to operate under an ‘honor code,’ with little risk of government audit.” (footnote omitted)). 
 216. What follows is draft language for a naturalization costs credit.   
26 U.S.C.A. §___ Naturalization Costs Credit 
 (a) Allowance of Credit 
  (1) In General—In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a credit against 
tax imposed by this chapter, the amount of qualified naturalization expenses paid by the taxpayer in 
the taxable year. [Note: if Congress decided to allow a credit for legal fees tied to naturalization, this 
language could be modified to allow the credit in the year after expenses were paid or delayed until 
naturalization is finalized.] 
 (b) Definitions 
  (1) Qualified naturalization expenses––The term “qualified naturalization expenses” 
means expenses paid by the taxpayer which are directly related to the taxpayer’s naturalization 
application and the naturalization application(s) of family member of the taxpayer. 
  (2) Family member—[Herein another decision would need to be made regarding how 
expansive the credit should be. A more conservative credit could limit the definition of family to that 
of § 267. A more extensive credit could adopt a broader view of family such as that of § 152.] 
  (c) Limitations 
 217. Tax expenditure analysis could inform the proper availability and amount of the credit. 
This Article makes no attempt to quantify revenue costs or dictate the appropriate scope of the 
credit. 
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are numerous, and more work would be necessary to take the preliminary 
concept of a naturalization costs credit to fruition. Nevertheless, it seems 
a conservative, nimble response to provide some relief to LPRs who face 
the insecurity and disproportionate burdens of tax citizen status. 
4. Tax Rates 
This third, broader reform response is likely the most controversial 
of the three. Policymakers and scholars should consider whether the cur-
rent tax regime—taxing tax citizens and U.S. citizens the same—is justi-
fied in light of the key differences between citizens and LPRs. There is 
little question that we can tax LPRs. But the decision that we should does 
not follow from the fact that we can. Nor does saying we should tax 
noncitizens answer the question of what is the proper rate of tax.218 
The tax-immigration nexus makes evident that LPRs face dispro-
portionate punishments—ineligibility for naturalization and removal—
for the same offenses that result in monetary or criminal penalties for 
U.S. citizens. What to make of the lack of proportionality is less clear. 
An overreaction to the unfairness of the insecurity and disproportionate 
punishments LPRs face would be to exclude them entirely from the taxa-
ble community. A tax system that does not tax noncitizens living, work-
ing in, and benefiting from its economy and laws would shift the income 
tax burden entirely to citizens; a result that seems unfair to citizens and 
would be bad economic policy. Thus, tax law’s codification of performa-
tive citizenship in the resident alien definition seems justified. After all, 
LPRs and U.S. citizens may be indistinguishable when judged by their 
enmeshment in their communities and both receive many of the same 
benefits. Tax citizen status is, herein, an example of law as culture—we 
tax LPRs the same as citizens because we believe they are, in many 
ways, substantially similar. Tax citizen status also performs a discipli-
nary role: if you want to become a citizen you have to play by the same 
rules as citizens. The significant role tax compliance plays in the tax-
immigration nexus shows that paying taxes is a key part of the process of 
constructing good citizens. But the tax-immigration nexus also drives 
home that despite all the ways in which LPRs may resemble citizens and 
why it may be good immigration policy to tax them as such, they are not 
full, formal citizens. Taxing LPRs by the same laws and at the same rates 
may then emerge as being fundamentally unfair, as it fails to account for 
the significant ways in which tax citizenship falls short of formal citizen-
ship—most notably permanence of status (or lack thereof). Perhaps, then, 
  
 218. Scholars recognize the same issues are at play in the discussion of taxation of nonresident 
citizens. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, supra note 13, at 446–48; Mason, supra note 
13, at 175–77; Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 1314–16. A founding principle of international taxation 
that persists in tax treaties is that a source country’s laws “must not tax such income in a manner that 
discriminates against foreigners.” GRAETZ, supra note 69, at 33. Taxing noncitizens at a lower rate 
would not seem to run afoul of this principle. 
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the appropriate reaction to the challenge of taxing LPRs—clear members 
of the taxable community but insecure as compared to formal citizens of 
that community—is to tax LPRs at lower rates. 
Before addressing the likely objections to this proposed reform, let 
me set forth a basic structure. Taxing noncitizens at modified rates could 
be accomplished without overhauling the current tax regime.219 Lowering 
the tax rate on LPRs could take the form of an additional rate schedule 
and filing status added to § 1 with modified income thresholds. Recall 
Ishita whose $35,000 of taxable income places her in the 15% bracket as 
a head of household filer. Under the head of household rate schedule, 
Ishita jumps into the 15% bracket with taxable income over $13,250.220 
If we believe LPRs should have the opportunity to earn more income 
before having that income taxed at a 15% rate we could set the threshold 
for the 15% bracket at a higher point—$17,250, for example. As such, 
where Ishita’s taxable income results in liability of $4,588 in the head of 
household brackets her “LPR” brackets would lead to only $3,988 of tax 
liability.221 Other options for reducing tax rates on LPRs include allow-
ing exclusion of or a deduction for some portion of an LPR’s income not 
unlike the foreign earned income exclusion of § 911.222 As with a credit, 
the options for how to structure tax relief to reduce LPRs’ share of the 
tax burden are multiple and this Article does not detail specifics, but ra-
ther simply suggests that such a reform may be appropriate. With the 
broad sweeps of a rate reduction in mind, let us turn now to potential 
objections to such a reform. 
Three significant objections arise when considering tax relief tar-
geted at individuals with a particular status (or lack thereof). First, that 
providing tax relief to LPRs is unfair to citizens.223 To the extent an LPR 
and resident citizen receive substantially the same benefits from their 
local, state, and the federal governments, perhaps they should be taxed at 
the same rates. Or to the extent an LPR earns the same amount of taxable 
income as a citizen, then both share a similar ability to pay and should be 
taxed at a given rate. Why then, should an LPR receive a tax cut? The 
  
 219. The European Union has seen differing treatment on nonresidents and residents in mem-
ber countries. HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 521 (3rd ed. 2010). Attempting to balance sovereignty of member countries 
with the goal of free movement for individuals, the Court has found that tax provisions that treat 
nonresident taxpayers differently than resident taxpayers violates prohibitions against discrimination 
on the basis of nationality. Id. Among the differing treatment the Court prohibited are laws that taxed 
nonresidents at higher rates than residents. Id. at 522–21. 
 220. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. 
 221. Depending upon how the brackets are set, it is possible an existing status could result in 
lower tax liability than the LPR status. In that case, an LPR could be permitted to simply elect the 
more favorable schedule. 
 222. I.R.C. § 911 (2012) (excluding qualifying foreign income from U.S. tax). 
 223. Whether such a reform could pass with the current Congress is a different issue than 
whether it would make for a more equitable tax system. I do not attempt herein to address that issue. 
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answer to that question goes back to the significance we ascribe to the 
insecurity LPRs face because of the tax-immigration nexus. 
Using benefit theory to support a different rate schedule departs 
from policy justifications for differences in existing rate schedules. For 
example, ability to pay, not benefit theory, supports the separate head of 
household rate schedule. Is an LPR’s status as a tax citizen similarly rel-
evant? LPRs face naturalization costs that impact their ability to pay tax, 
but those costs come in isolated years. Additionally, those costs may be 
seen as elective consumption decisions distinct from dependent support 
costs, a view that would cast naturalization costs as a nondeductible per-
sonal expense or an issue better remedied by the proposed credit.224 The 
insecurity LPRs face on account of tax law’s role in immigration law and 
policy persists unless or until that LPR naturalizes, however, at which 
time she transitions from tax citizen to formal citizen. It is not, then, a 
one-time cost or investment easily solved by a credit. An LPR rate 
schedule would ultimately be based upon the inequities seen by applying 
benefit theory in light of the tax-immigration nexus, rather than ability to 
pay. As such, the LPR schedule and filing status would be a departure 
from the norm of current tax policy, though not necessarily an unwar-
ranted one. 
Second, one might object to a different rate schedule for LPRs out 
of a concern for the incentives it could create to remain an LPR rather 
than naturalize and the corollary revenue effects. Proponents of marriage 
penalty relief levy similar criticisms of the current tax outcomes of the 
married filing jointly schedule for some couples. The logic goes as fol-
lows: because being married increases tax liability for some couples, tax 
law disincentivizes marriage in a meaningful way.225 I (and others) be-
lieve this argument assumes too much.226 Marriage and citizenship are 
emotionally, social and culturally-charged statuses that individuals desire 
for any number of rational and irrational reasons. Despite my own incli-
  
 224. See I.R.C. § 262 (2012) (specifying that personal expenses are not deductible). Drawing 
the line between consumption decisions that are ignored for tax and those that should give rise to 
some adjustment to tax liability is no easy task. To some scholars, children are a personal consump-
tion decision. See, e.g., HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938). Ultimately, resolving 
these conflicts requires returning to foundational philosophical and social policy discussions that are 
subject to significant disagreement. 
 225. See, e.g., James Pethokoukis, Here’s Exactly How Marriage Penalties Discourage Mar-
riage, AEIDEAS (Feb. 25, 2014, 11:26 AM), https://www.aei.org/publication/heres-exactly-how-
marriage-penalties-discourage-marriage/. 
 226. There are many compelling reasons to be concerned with the relevance to and treatment of 
marriage under the tax code. See Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
805, 805–07 (2008); Tessa R. Davis, Mapping the Families of the Internal Revenue Code, 22 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 179, 191–93 (2015); Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpay-
er in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 652–53 (2010); Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronorma-
tivity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 131–34 (1998); Theodore P. Seto, The 
Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529, 1568 (2008); Law-
rence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. 
REV. 1, 1–2 (2000). 
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nation to believe that tax law and policy matter to the daily lives of indi-
viduals, there are limits. A less speculative response to this objection 
would be to simply limit the availability of the preferential rate schedule 
to a set period of time, not unlike the surviving spouse rules that allow an 
unmarried individual to continue to use the married filing jointly status 
for two years after the taxable year in which his spouse passes away.227 
An LPR schedule could be available for a similarly circumscribed time 
to counter any disincentive to naturalization. The ready time period that 
volunteers itself is five years, as many LPRs are ineligible for naturaliza-
tion without five years continuous residence.228 Though an imperfect 
metric, the law would effectively use an LPR’s failure to apply for citi-
zenship as a signal that permanence of status is of lower value to her than 
to an individual who applies as soon as is possible. To the extent an LPR 
does not value permanence of status, the benefits gulf between she and a 
citizen lessens. 
A third objection to a different rate may come from immigrants’ 
rights advocates. Immigrant advocacy groups frequently highlight the 
fact that immigrants routinely comply with tax laws, countering rhetoric 
that negatively casts immigrants as burdens to the fisc.229 Studies support 
these statements, showing that immigrants contribute significantly to 
state and federal economies.230 The tax-immigration nexus highlights the 
role tax compliance plays in making citizens. If LPRs or other immi-
grants were to pay less in taxes, the lower burden could subject an al-
ready vulnerable population to the allegation that by paying less in taxes, 
its members have less purchase on the right to citizenship. The inequity 
of taxing LPRs and U.S. citizens the same could, in other words, become 
buried in the rhetoric of desert. Thus, while tax policy analysis of fair-
ness might justify a lower tax burdens for LPRs, immigration policy 
might intervene to stop such a reform. 
As this discussion illustrates, a preferential rate schedule for LPRs 
is subject to objections. By providing comprehensive tax relief, as op-
posed to the one-off relief of a naturalization credit, however, a rate re-
form better respects the fact that LPRs face insecurity and disproportion-
  
 227. I.R.C. § 2(a) (2012) (providing the definition of a surviving spouse). 
 228. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2012). For a helpful list of the naturalization requirements LPRs face, 
see U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 22, at 18–21. 
 229. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 26 (“‘So many people say we are here burdening the 
country, but we are paying their retirements,’ he told me. For now, he doesn’t mind supporting the 
social security system, he says, but hopes one day he can reap the benefits too.”); Do Immigrants 
Take American Jobs, Use Our Services Without Paying Taxes, and Cost American Taxpayers Mon-
ey?, AM. FOR IMMIGRANT JUST., 
http://www.aijustice.org/do_immigrants_take_american_jobs_use_our_services_without_paying_tax
es_and_cost_americans_taxpayers_money (last visited Oct. 26, 2016). 
 230. For a sampling of helpful studies, see HEATHER GIBNEY & PETER S. FISHER, IOWA 
POLICY PROJECT, IMMIGRANTS IN IOWA: WHAT NEW IOWANS CONTRIBUTE TO THE STATE 
ECONOMY (2014); INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS’ STATE 
AND LOCAL TAX CONTRIBUTIONS (2013); NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., THE ECONOMIC 
AND FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION (Francine D. Blau & Christopher Mackie eds., 2016). 
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ate punishments for tax offenses every year that they are LPRs, and that 
these factors are relevant to tax on horizontal equity grounds. At the 
same time, the fact that LPRs would remain part of the taxable communi-
ty means the disciplinary or constructive role tax plays in requiring 
would-be citizens to act as such is not lost, nor is the basic benefit/burden 
bargain. Current law, by taxing LPRs on the same terms as citizens, sup-
ports the project of training citizens but fails to account for the differ-
ences between tax and formal citizens. Arguably, however, remedying 
one perceived inequity may give rise to another in the eyes of formal 
citizens to whom LPRs bear significant resemblance. The goal of this 
Article is not to unequivocally state that a given proposed reform is right. 
Rather, it is, in part, to add a new thread to the conversation on citizen-
ship-based taxation by introducing the concept of the tax-immigration 
nexus and suggesting that current tax law, in light of the nexus, is too 
heavily weighted against LPRs. 
C. A Note on Salience and the Tax-Immigration Nexus 
As discussed above, tweaking the tax-immigration nexus may posi-
tively impact tax compliance by enhancing the perceived fairness of the 
system and, thereby, its legitimacy. In this effort, the salience231 of tax 
law to noncitizens should be further explored. New arrivals to the United 
States and immigrants seeking more permanent status are, or should be, 
very aware of the importance of tax compliance on the pathway to legal 
status or citizenship. Accordingly, the tax-immigration nexus creates an 
opportunity for tax law and policy to use this salience to support compli-
ance among citizen and noncitizen populations. Under current law, the 
tax-immigration nexus casts tax in a coercive and punitive light. As we 
have seen, noncompliance, whether intentional or inadvertent, with tax 
law may result not only in penalties but grave collateral consequences.232 
Any of the three proposed reforms could increase immigrants’ percep-
tions of the tax code as fundamentally fair. 233 By granting LPRs lower 
rates, a tax credit to assist with naturalization costs, or modifying report-
ing requirements the tax system appears to strike a balance between sup-
porting the idea that paying taxes is an obligation of citizenship while 
recognizing that LPRs are not yet citizens and, as such, perhaps should 
not bear the full brunt of what is one of the key responsibilities of citi-
zenship.234 Such a shift could lend support to the idea that tax compliance 
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is a positive expression of fiscal citizenship rather than simply a potential 
roadblock on the path to naturalization.235 Empirical research could ex-
pand on this idea and further develop its relevance to both tax compli-
ance and immigration policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Tax and immigration law are, at first glance, two areas of law with 
policy goals and responsibilities that do not seem to overlap. Tax law 
focuses on revenue collection, albeit with extensive forays into social 
and economic policy. Immigration law concerns regulating who can 
come and go from the country and who is entitled to restricted or full 
membership in the national community. The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kawashima v. Holder provided a tip-off to a connection between immi-
gration and tax. Looking further reveals the extensive tax-immigration 
nexus. 
Citizenship is the common thread that runs through and unites these 
seemingly disparate subjects. Social theory teaches us that citizenship is 
more than formal legal status, but a practice performed by individuals to 
varying degrees. Utilizing this broader concept of citizenship, the num-
ber of connections between tax and immigration increases. Tracing those 
points of connection reveals a robust tax-immigration nexus in which 
immigration law relies upon tax to construct and police the requirements 
of formal citizenship, and tax law utilizes both a formal, immigration 
law-based and performative concept of citizenship to define the taxable 
community. Thus, these two bodies of law that appear to be relatively 
isolated from one another are, in fact, intimately entwined. Moreover, the 
depth and breadth of the tax-immigration nexus pushes us to reconsider 
whether the current taxation of LPRs is equitable in light of the key ways 
in which LPRs differ from formal U.S. citizens. 
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